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T

ODAY’S treatises tell us that in order to have standing to
challenge government action in federal court, a challenger
must establish an “injury in fact.”1 This is a constitutional requirement, which means that Congress cannot authorize those without it
to bring suit in federal court.2 The trick, of course, is identifying
what counts as an injury in fact—and here the doctrine is widely
regarded to be a mess.3 The injury must be individual,4 imminent,5
and concrete6 (although it can be widely shared7). It must be caused
by the defendant’s actions,8 and the court’s judgment must be capable of redressing that injury.9 It is much easier to identify what
does not count as an injury in fact. All seem to agree that injury to

1

3 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise §§ 16.2–16.4 (4th ed. 2002).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–18 (2007); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
3
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 15–17 (1984); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 221–24 (1988); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 276 (2008);
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 612–14 (2004); Cass R.
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,
147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 639–41 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1464 (1988).
4
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735–36 (1972).
5
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).
6
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508
(1975); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740 n.16 (1972).
7
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
8
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).
9
Id.
2

MAGILL_BOOK

2009]

8/19/2009 6:46 PM

Standing for the Public

1133

the general interest we all have in seeing the government abide by
the law cannot constitute an injury in fact.10
But the truth is, for several decades in the middle of the last century, Congress was allowed to authorize legal challenges to government action by parties whose only cognizable interest was just
that: that the government abide by the law. These legal challenges
were mostly (though not exclusively) brought by those who competed economically with regulated parties. As Part I of this Article
will explain, these challengers had no legally cognizable basis to
object to the government’s action. In the language of the doctrine
at that time, these parties had no “legal rights” and, as a consequence, they would not have had standing in the absence of action
by Congress. Congress, however, was permitted by statute to authorize these parties to bring before the court allegedly illegal action by government actors.
In its cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged that these parties
had no legally cognizable injury—no legal rights—but it held nonetheless that Congress could authorize such parties to, as the Supreme Court itself said, bring the government’s “legal errors” to
the attention of the federal courts “on behalf of the public.” There
were doubters and dissenters who questioned the constitutionality
of this arrangement. Those doubts were expressed in the pages of
law reviews, dissents in the Supreme Court, and, as the archival
materials on the cases reveal, in private correspondence between a
prominent jurist and Justice Douglas. Despite these doubts, the
Supreme Court unquestionably sanctioned this “standing for the
public” regime as constitutional.
Ironically, this mid-century approach to the vindication of public
rights in the courts disappeared in the very period that is best

10
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007) (“We will not, therefore,
entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”) (internal citation omitted); Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (“[I]njury
to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed . . . deprives the case of the concrete
specificity that characterized those controversies which were the traditional concern
of the courts at Westminster.”) (internal citation omitted); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74
(“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about . . . every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111
(“[A] federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than
assert that certain practices . . . are unconstitutional.”).
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known for its doctrinal innovations that liberalized the law of
standing. While the Supreme Court and lower courts did expand
standing in important respects between the middle of the 1960s and
the 1970s, they simultaneously retreated from the standing for the
public approach of the previous decades. This retreat happened in
fits and starts in the lower courts and the Supreme Court. It is a
complicated story that will be set forth in Part II of this Article,
which relies on analysis of both the key cases and the internal papers of the Supreme Court Justices where available. While the
story of the erasure of the standing for the public principle is complicated, it had straightforward consequences for the relationship
between Congress and Article III courts. After the fall of this principle, Congress was less free (than it had been before) to structure
the judicial enforcement of legal obligations imposed on government actors.
Why courts were comfortable with standing to raise the rights of
the public conferred by statutes in the middle of the last century,
and then retreated from this approach, is not easy to explain. Any
legal change is difficult to explain persuasively and here the difficulty is multiplied because of the cross-currents in the evolving law.
Part III of this Article will seek to understand the Court’s retreat
from the standing for the public principle by first providing some
context for it. The Article will examine developments outside the
Court that had an effect on the sorts of cases that came into federal
courts. In this period, a new model of reformist politics emerged
with full force. That model treated litigation as a central tool in the
effort to advance social reform. Not coincidentally, this is the era
when the number of lawyers devoted to public interest causes exploded. Congress fully embraced this model of reformist politics as
it created a new generation of regulatory agencies. Congress
carved out a role for public interest lawyers to bring suit to force
government to do its job and, in some cases, to stand in for the
government and enforce legal obligations imposed upon private
parties.
Part III will close by suggesting that this context provides a
credible explanation for why the Court retreated from its earlier
embrace of the standing for the public principle. Those standing for
the public between the 1940s and the early 1960s were mostly economic competitors, but in the middle of the 1960s and 1970s, those
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challenging the government’s compliance with the law were part of
the explosion in public interest law that occurred in that era. Instead of economic competitors, the courts confronted civil rights
groups challenging the Federal Communications Commission and
environmentalists challenging the Federal Power Commission and
the National Park Service. Such public interest lawyers were familiar from the civil rights movement, of course, but their interest in
bringing litigation to challenge the behavior of regulatory agencies
was new. While the political branches embraced this model of reformist politics, the story in the Supreme Court was altogether different. These “ideological” litigators quite clearly discomforted the
Court. That discomfort, it seems fair to speculate given the key Supreme Court opinions, played a role in the demise of the standing
for the public principle.
I. STANDING PRIOR TO 1970: LEGAL RIGHTS AND STANDING FOR
THE PUBLIC
Prior to 1970, the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in cases
challenging agency action proceeded along two tracks.11 One track
applied when the source of law giving rise to the challenger’s claim
did not identify who could challenge administrative action. A statute might authorize a court to set agency action aside,12 but would
not specify which parties were permitted to bring such actions. In
such cases, the challenger had to identify injury to a “legal right”
(sometimes called a “legal wrong”) to establish standing to challenge administrative action. The other track applied when, in an
agency-specific statute, Congress identified which parties could
challenge administrative action. These provisions—commonly
known as “special statutory review” provisions—varied from statute to statute, but a standard formulation was that those who were
“adversely affected” or “aggrieved” by agency action could chal11

See 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 22.03–22.04 (1958);
Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 505–31 (1965).
12
See, e.g., Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 212 (“No interlocutory injunction suspending . . . any order made or entered by the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be issued or granted . . . unless the application for the same shall be presented to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three
judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge, and unless a majority of said
three judges shall concur in granting such application.”).
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lenge it in court.13 As this part will demonstrate, the legal right test
contemplated that only legally recognized individual rights could
be adjudicated by courts, but the courts permitted those proceeding under “party aggrieved” provisions to bring what judges themselves called “public rights” to courts for their adjudication.
A. Legal Wrongs
The first track required a party to identify a legal wrong in order
to challenge governmental action.14 An exemplary legal wrong was
an alleged infringement of a common law right. Government action that allegedly constituted a tort, an infringement of property,
or a breach of a contract clearly qualified.15 Even in the absence of
the violation of a common law right, a statute could create a right
or privilege in particular parties, the alleged denial of which would
be sufficient to establish standing.16 To determine whether a party
had asserted injury to a legal right, courts would survey the relevant sources of law to see whether the challenger to government
action had a legally protected interest that had allegedly been disregarded.17
13

Davis, supra note 11, at 215; Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1055
(1938) (“In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order. . . any person
who will be adversely affected by such order . . . [may] file a petition with the United
States court of appeals . . . .”); Federal Water Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 860 (1935)
(“Any party . . . aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission . . . may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals . . . by filing in such court . . .
a written petition . . . .”); National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 455
(1935) (“Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review
of such order in any United States court of appeals . . . by filing in such court a written
petition . . . .”); Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (1934) (“Appeals
may be taken . . . (1) By an applicant . . . whose application is refused . . . (2) By any
other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of
the Commission . . . .”); Securities Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 80 (1933) (“Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission may obtain a review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals . . . by filing in such court . . . a written petition . . . .”).
14
Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 256–57 (1930).
15
Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939); see Jaffe, supra note
11, at 511–12.
16
Tenn. Elec. Power, 306 U.S. at 137 (holding a “legal right” can be “founded on a
statute which confers a privilege”).
17
See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 289–90, 305 (1944) (granting standing to milk
producers to challenge price levels set by Secretary of Agriculture and War Food
Administrator); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942)
(granting standing to radio network to contest a regulation which “purport[ed] . . . to
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The legal wrong test was developed in a series of cases involving
challenges to decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC). In each, the Court confronted challengers to administrative
action who were not the objects of the ICC orders (they did not
pay the rate; they were not denied ownership) but rather parties
whose competitive positions were affected by an ICC decision. In a
1923 case, manufacturers of lumber complained about an ICC order that required a railroad to eliminate a storage charge on lumber that remained in railcars after they reached their destination.
The charge had been imposed during the war because of a car
shortage, and the ICC eliminated it once the rail car shortage
ended. Lumber manufacturers who had not needed to pay the
charge did not want to lose the advantage they had over manufacturers who did need to pay the charge. They challenged the legality
of the ICC’s order—arguing that it deprived the railroads of their
property without due process—but the Supreme Court said they
had no standing because they could not allege that the order subjected them to “legal injury.”18 The challenger’s legal right, said the
Court, was “limited to protection against unjust discrimination.”19
Exactly what the Court meant by legal right was further elaborated in two more cases, one in 1924 and one in 1930. The first involved a challenge to the ICC’s decision to permit one railroad to
acquire control of a crucial and previously independent rail terminal in Chicago.20 Before the ICC order, the terminal was not controlled by any carrier, and it was used by all railroads entering Chicago. Rival railroads that had used the terminal intervened in the
ICC proceedings and, when they lost, challenged the ICC decision
in court, arguing that there was no evidence to support the ICC
finding that the acquisition was in the “public interest.” The Supreme Court held that these competitors had a “legal interest” and
therefore had standing to challenge the ICC’s decision. The
Court’s analysis revealed that this “legal interest” was based on the
alter and affect adversely appellant’s contractual rights . . . with station owners.”);
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (denying standing to contest
administrative minimum wage determination affecting contractual bidding process);
Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1938) (denying standing to petitioner
objecting to disbursement of federal assistance to competitor power companies).
18
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 148 (1923).
19
Id.
20
The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 259–62 (1924).
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statutes administered by the ICC. Distinguishing the 1923 cases,
the Court noted that the parties were not complaining of more effective competition; the relevant statutes did not require the ICC
to consider the maintenance of their competitive position. Instead,
they were complaining that they had not been treated equally. Under the Act, they were entitled to be so treated.21 That is, the statute required the ICC to consider the interests of all parties equally
as it considered whether to grant a monopoly to one: the challengers’ claim was that the ICC did not do so, and they thus alleged a
violation of a legal right.22
The trilogy of cases was completed in the 1930 case of Alexander
Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States.23 The pattern was familiar. The
ICC had eliminated a two-tiered rate structure for the shipment of
cotton. Although the railroads subject to the rate structure as well
as the shippers who had benefited from the previous two-tier rate
structure challenged the ICC’s decision, only the shippers—whose
competitive advantage over other shippers had been eliminated by
the ICC’s new single rate—sought Supreme Court review of the
agency’s decision. The shippers had intervened in the ICC’s proceeding, but the court nonetheless held that they had no standing
because they had no legal right. According to the Court, the shipper was permitted to intervene in the proceeding because it was
threatened with a loss of “an advantage,” but that by itself did not
mean it had a legal right sufficient to confer standing. The shippers
had “no independent right which is violated by the order.”24 As
shippers, they were entitled “only to reasonable service at reasonable rates and without unjust discrimination.”25 The elimination of
the competitive advantage they enjoyed had compromised neither
of these legal rights and thus they had no standing. As the contrast
between Sprunt and its predecessors makes clear, the cases apply-

21

Id. at 267.
The Court bolstered its holding with two points. The parties had been permitted
to intervene in the agency proceeding, indicating that the ICC thought they had a legally protected interest. More than that, the Court noted that if those who had participated in the proceeding had no standing, “there would in some cases be no redress
for the injury inflicted by an illegal order.” Id. at 268.
23
281 U.S. 249 (1930).
24
Id. at 255.
25
Id.
22
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ing the “legal wrong” test were sometimes difficult to reconcile.26
But the inquiry was straightforward: has the challenger asserted
that the law requires the agency to take account of his interest and
that agency has failed to do so?27
B. Standing for the Public
In 1940, the Supreme Court embraced a different approach to
standing. This approach allowed Congress to authorize challenges
to administrative action by those who did not have legal rights. As
these challengers had no cognizable rights of their own, they had
standing—and the courts were explicit about this—to raise the
rights of the public. The case in which this approach was born, FCC
v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,28 involved a familiar pattern. An
economic competitor to the object of regulatory action (the present
holder of a broadcast license near Dubuque, Iowa) complained
about a regulatory action (FCC permitting a newspaper company
to construct a broadcast station in Dubuque) that harmed its competitive position.
The Supreme Court’s twin holdings in the case made clear its
departure from the “legal right” test. The Court first held that economic injury to a rival was not in and of itself an element that the
FCC was obliged to consider as it determined whether its action
would satisfy the “public interest, convenience, and necessity”
standard of the Communications Act. In other words, the challenger had no legal right. The Court then asked whether—“since
absence of right implies absence of remedy”—the party had standing to challenge the FCC’s action. 29
But, according to the Court, it did not follow from the nonexistence of a legal right that the challenger had no standing. The
Communications Act permitted judicial review by “any . . . person
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected” by certain
FCC decisions.30 As the Court saw it, if it applied the legal right
test, the Court would deprive that statutory provision of any effect.

26

See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 510–12.
See id. at 507.
28
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
29
Id. at 477.
30
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1940).
27
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It read “aggrieved” parties to be those without legal rights who
were nonetheless permitted under the statute to bring a challenge
to agency action. The message here was clear: the legal right test
was a court-constructed doctrine that Congress could override by
statutorily authorizing a legal challenge. In Sanders Brothers, the
Court went on to explain that Congress might have good reason for
doing just that. The Court speculated that, although competitors
did not have legal rights at common law or conferred by the statute, Congress might have “been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate
court errors of law in the action of the Commission.”31
This holding was not some slip of a 1940 typewriter. It is clear
that the key words just discussed in Sanders Brothers were carefully considered. This is because the final opinion printed in the
U.S. Reports contained two changes from the slip opinion and both
of these changes were relevant to the key language cited here.
First, the slip opinion had initially explained that Congress might
have wanted to allow a party who was “injured” to bring errors of
law before the courts, but the final version added the qualifier that
Congress may have wanted one who was likely to be “financially
injured” to bring errors before the courts.32 Second, the opinion
was amended to take out entirely the following sentence: “In this
view, while the injury to such person would not be the subject of
redress, that person might be the instrument, upon an appeal, of
redressing an injury to the public service which would otherwise
remain without remedy.”33 While this author has found no further
explanation for these amendments to the opinion, the very fact of
their existence confirms that the words were not used casually.

31

Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 477.
309 U.S. 642 (No. 499) (emphasis added) (“The opinion in this case is amended by
inserting the word ‘financially’ between the words ‘be’ and ‘injured’ in the last line on
page 5 . . . .”); FCC v. Sanders Bros., No. 499, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1940).
33
309 U.S. 642 (No. 499) (referring to the striking of a sentence in the opinion that
starts “In” and ends in “remedy”). The full sentence that was struck is discussed in a
letter from Judge Jerome Frank to Justice Douglas dated March 31, 1942 and contained in Justice Douglas’ case files on Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, No. 41-508. See FCC v. Sanders Bros., No. 499, slip op. at 6
(U.S. Mar. 25, 1940).
32
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These amendments to the opinion notwithstanding, courts and
commentators read Sanders Brothers to allow those without legal
rights to sue on behalf of the public. Indeed, some judges and
commentators found it constitutionally troublesome for just this
reason. In the immediate aftermath of the case, some commentators asked whether allowing a challenger who had no legal right to
challenge administrative action could be squared with Article III’s
requirement of a case or controversy.34
Supreme Court Justices themselves were soon debating the legitimacy of the arrangement the Sanders Brothers Court had sanctioned. Two years later, in 1942’s Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, the Supreme Court considered whether a Court of Appeals could stay the enforcement of an
FCC order pending the determination of an appeal brought under
the statutory review provision at issue in Sanders Brothers. That
provision did not explicitly authorize the issuance of such an order,
and, by contrast, judicial review obtained under other provisions of
the statute did do so. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
held that appellate courts did have the power to issue a stay of an
agency order pending an appeal under the “party aggrieved” provision.35 In the course of doing so, the majority and the dissent engaged in a debate about whether the fact that the review provision
permitted parties to bring “public rights” before the courts meant
anything about the power of courts to issue a stay of proceedings.
Justice Frankfurter relied heavily on the traditional power of
courts to issue stays pending appeals. But to Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, this history was irrelevant because of the kind of legal rights that aggrieved parties were presenting. As he put it, “All
constitutional questions aside, we should require explicit, unequivocal authorization before we permit[] an appellant who has
no individual substantive right at stake in the litigation to obtain a

34

Harry P. Warner, Some Constitutional and Administrative Implications of the
Sanders Case, 4 Fed. Comm. B.J. 214, 217–30 (1940); see also Edwin Borchard, Challenging “Penal” Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 Yale L.J. 445, 451 n.16 (1943);
Comment on Recent Decisions, Administrative Law—Federal Communications
Commission, 26 Wash. U. L.Q. 121, 122 (1940); Recent Cases, Administrative Law—
Judicial Review of Decisions Under the Communications Act of 1934, 8 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev 1106, 1107 (1940).
35
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11–13 (1942).
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stay to protect the public interest.”36 Justice Frankfurter responded
that the nature of the rights did not matter:
The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private
rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest
in communications. By [the judicial review provision] Congress
gave the right of appeal to persons “aggrieved or whose interests
are adversely affected” by Commission action. But these private
litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest. That a court is called upon to enforce public rights and not
the interests of private property does not diminish its power to
protect such rights. . . . An historic procedure for preserving
rights during the pendency of an appeal is no less appropriate—
unless Congress has chosen to withdraw it—because the rights to
be vindicated are those of the public and not of the private litigants. . . . To [withhold this power] would stultify the purpose of
Congress to utilize the courts as a means for vindicating the pub37
lic interest.

The striking point here is the Court’s understanding of what Congress has done—permitting aggrieved private parties to vindicate
the public’s interest in court—and its easy acceptance of that arrangement.
Justice Douglas’ papers reveal that his dissent in ScrippsHoward38 was informed by two letters to the Justice from Judge
Jerome N. Frank of the Second Circuit. Those letters are especially
revealing about the meaning of Sanders Brothers.39 Judge Frank
wrote the letters (marked private) in response to a request from
Justice Douglas.40 In the first letter, he explained that “some language” in Sanders Brothers could be understood to permit parties
36

Id. at 20 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 14–15 (citations omitted).
38
316 U.S. at 18–22.
39
Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Justice Douglas (Mar. 31, 1942) (William O.
Douglas Papers, Files on Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm’n, No. 41-508, Box 65, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington,
D.C.) [hereinafter Frank Letter 1]; letter from Jerome N. Frank to Justice Douglas
(April 1, 1942) (William O. Douglas Papers, Files on Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm’n, No. 41-508, Box 65, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Frank Letter 2].
40
Frank Letter 1, supra note 39, page 1 (marked “Personal”; “Dear Bill: Responding to your request, I write the following in haste.”).
37
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without a proper injury to challenge government action. The language in Sanders Brothers that could be so construed, Frank wrote,
was the language that indicated that one likely to be injured would
have a “sufficient interest” to bring the government’s errors before
the courts. Here is how Judge Frank (colloquially) explained it:
In view of the decision, that language can be regarded as dictum.
If not so regarded, it is fundamentally at variance with the cases
41
I’ve cited above. See, for instance, how Sanders has been interpreted by Edgerton, J. . . . He says that the Supreme Court held
that the intervening competitor may appear “as a kind of King’s
proctor, to vindicate the public interest” Gosh! Can a provision,
couched in general terms, in an “appeal” section of a statute,
constitutionally confer on the federal courts a power to pass
upon the validity of official action where no case or controversy
exists, although a statute specifically and expressly so providing is
unconstitutional, as the Court held in Muskrat v. United States?
Where is there any constitutional power to confer on any citizen
the power, as a sort of “King’s proctor,” to vindicate the public
42
interest?”

In a follow-up letter, Judge Frank made the same point more precisely. Because the challenger in Sanders Brothers had no legal injury, he wrote, “he had no cause of action and there was no case or
controversy before the court,” and if the statute meant that such a
person “showing no case or controversy could nevertheless call on
the courts to consider such an issue, then that statute was, pro
tanto, unconstitutional.”43

41
Footnote not in original text. In the first paragraph of the letter, Judge Frank had
noted that “[u]nless there is an invasion of the citizen’s individual interest, of a recognized character, any financial loss he suffers is damnum absque injuria.” Frank Letter
1, supra note 39, at 1. Judge Frank provided the following citations for that proposition:
“Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447; Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464; Tenn.
Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,
125, 129; Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346;
Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75, 78; Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464,
469; Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126;
Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, at 460–66.” Id.
42
Frank Letter 1, supra note 39, at 2 (citation omitted).
43
Frank Letter 2, supra note 39.
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Judge Frank did not miss the significance of Sanders Brothers.
Writing to Justice Douglas in 1942, Frank unquestionably viewed
this reading of Sanders Brothers as both plausible and problematic.
In his letter, he offered a way of reading the case that would avoid
the difficulty.44 Something remarkably similar to that view did appear in the United States Reports, but it appeared in Justice Douglas’ dissent in Scripps-Howard.45 After these cases were decided by
the Supreme Court, with Judge Frank’s view of the matter not carrying the day, it was none other than Judge Frank who attempted
to come to terms with the meaning of this line of cases in a wellknown appellate court decision. In that decision, discussed shortly,
Judge Frank offered a now famous term to reconcile the requirements of Article III and the Sanders Brothers line of cases. He explained that the Sanders Brothers line of cases allowed Congress to
deputize “private Attorney Generals” to bring cases before the
federal courts that would not otherwise be cognizable.
But the Supreme Court was not yet finished with its discussion
of the standing for the public principle. Just one year later, in
1943’s FCC v. NBC (KOA),46 the Supreme Court again opined on
Sanders Brothers’ meaning. The relevant question in the case was
whether a broadcaster who alleged that an FCC action might lead
to interference with its frequency was an aggrieved party within the
statutory review provision. Based on Sanders Brothers, the majority’s answer was a simple yes; an allegation of electrical interference, just like competitive injury, could make a party “aggrieved.”
What is most telling about KOA are the dissents. Justice Frankfurter, who primarily dissented on another matter, reviewed the
meaning of Sanders Brothers. According to Frankfurter, Sanders
Brothers meant that, while injury to a competitive position was not
a ground for setting aside an FCC action, it did create standing to
attack the FCC’s action on other grounds, namely, “to vindicate
the public interest.”47 He then observed that the constitutionality of
44

Frank Letter 1, supra note 39, at 3–4.
Compare 316 U.S. at 20–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that Sanders Brothers,
properly construed, means that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, but that does
not mean the litigant has a cause of action), with Frank Letter 1, supra note 39, at 3–4
(suggesting that the best reading of Sanders Brothers is that the provision confers jurisdiction but does not provide a cause of action).
46
319 U.S. 239 (1943).
47
Id. at 259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45
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this arrangement was settled: “Whatever doubts may have existed
as to whether the ingredients of ‘case’ or ‘controversy[]’ . . . are
present in this situation were dispelled by our ruling in the Sanders
case . . . .”48 But, Frankfurter continued, it could not be just any
party who is “aggrieved” and, in his view, the challenger’s allegations about injury were too speculative.49
Although more grumpy about it, Justice Douglas, who wrote his
own dissent, accepted this same view of Sanders Brothers. Douglas
noted that he had doubts about whether Sanders Brothers was correct as a matter of statutory interpretation and, more than that, was
concerned about the “constitutionality of a statutory scheme which
allowed one who showed no invasion of a private right to call on
the courts” to review the action of the agency.50 “But,” he continued, “if we accept as constitutionally valid a system of judicial review invoked by a private person who has no individual substantive
right to protect but who has standing only as a representative of
the public interest, then I think we must be exceedingly scrupulous
to see to it that his interest in the matter is substantial and immediate.”51 Why was this necessary? Otherwise, he wrote, “we will most
assuredly run afoul of the constitutional requirement of case or
controversy.”52 When Douglas applied his own test of who counted
as aggrieved, the challenger flunked.
One of the best-known explanations of Sanders Brothers was offered by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit. As described earlier,
Judge Frank had corresponded in 1942 with Justice Douglas about
the Scripps-Howard case, explaining that Sanders Brothers could
and had been read to authorize suits by those who did not have a
proper injury. After seeing his own view of the matter endorsed
only in dissent, Judge Frank then authored an opinion that explained Sanders Brothers as permitting suits by those without legal
injuries.

48

Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 260 (stating that the challenger failed to show that “its interests were substantially impaired”).
50
Id. at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51
Id. (citation omitted).
52
Id.
49
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The case was Associated Industries v. Ickes,53 where coal consumers sued the Secretary of the Interior, challenging a twentycent-per-ton price increase on bituminous coal sold in New York
State.54 The consumers alleged that the agency had exceeded its
statutory authority and that its findings of fact were not supported
by the record. Under the relevant statute, any party that participated in the agency proceeding and was “aggrieved” by a subsequently issued order could challenge the order in an appellate
court. The agency asserted that consumers did not have standing
because they were not “aggrieved.” The relevant statute, the
agency admitted, did safeguard the interests of consumers, but consumers’ interests were represented by a government official—
called “Consumers’ Counsel”—that the statute authorized to seek
judicial review of agency action but had not elected to do so. Thus
framed, the question was clear: Were consumers “aggrieved” by
the agency action such that they could challenge that action in
court on behalf of the public’s interest, an interest that was specifically vested in a government official to safeguard?
According to Judge Frank, Sanders Brothers meant that the answer was “yes.” Without the statutory review provision, Judge
Frank said it was clear that the consumers would not have standing
because they could not point to the invasion of a legal interest.55
But the statutory review provision granting the right of review to
any aggrieved party changed this. As Judge Frank put it:
The court, in the Sanders and Scripps-Howard cases, as we understand them, construed the “person aggrieved” review provision as a constitutionally valid statute authorizing a class of “persons aggrieved” to bring suit in a Court of Appeals to prevent
alleged unlawful official action in order to vindicate the public interest, although no personal substantive interest of such persons
had been or would be invaded. . . . If, then, one is a “person aggrieved,” he has authority by review proceedings under §6(b), to
vindicate the public interest involved in a violation of the Act by
53

134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
Interior’s rate-setting functions were performed pursuant to the Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937. Those functions were initially performed by the Bituminous Coal Commission, but the Commission was abolished in 1939, and its authority was then transferred to the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of Interior. Id. at 697.
55
Id. at 700–01.
54

MAGILL_BOOK

2009]

8/19/2009 6:46 PM

Standing for the Public

1147

respondents, even if he can show no past or threatened invasion
56
of any private legally protected substantive interest of his own.

The consumers, according to Judge Frank, were clearly “aggrieved.” Given that a competitor threatened with financial loss
was an aggrieved party, “a consumer threatened with financial loss
by a Commission’s order, which fixes prices and prevents competition among those from whom the consumer purchases, is also a
‘person aggrieved.’”57
It was in Ickes that Judge Frank coined the term that came to
describe this arrangement: the private attorney general.58 As Judge
Frank tried to reconcile Sanders Brothers and the constitutional
requirement of a case or controversy, he reasoned that, because
Congress could authorize the Attorney General to bring cases to
vindicate the interests of the public, it could also permit private individuals to vindicate the interests of the public. As he put it: “Such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.”59
Frank was not alone in his view of the meaning of the Sanders
Brothers line of cases. Two dominant scholars of administrative law
in the period agreed.60 In 1951, in his first treatise on administrative
law, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis read Sanders Brothers this way:
“The new development [in the Sanders case] is that the person with
standing (1) represents the public interest and (2) does not represent his own private interest, and that (3) the interests asserted on

56
Id. at 700, 705 (defining legal interest either as one of “‘recognized’ character, at
‘common law’ or a substantive private legally protected interest created by statute”)
(citations omitted).
57
Id. at 705.
58
Id. at 704. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General”
Is—And Why it Matters, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004).
59
Associated Industries, 134 F.2d at 704.
60
Sanders Brothers and its progeny are treated very briefly in the first Hart &
Wechsler federal courts casebook. The cases are discussed, under the heading “Actions by competitors,” with no reference made to the potentially broader significance
that the cases apparently had outside the limited context of competitor suits. See
Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
163–64 (1953).
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the appeal may be different from those which confer standing to
appeal.”61
Professor Louis Jaffe of Harvard Law School, in his landmark
1965 text, Judicial Control of Administration, had this to say about
Judge Frank’s reading of Sanders Brothers:
Judge Frank . . . believed, correctly in my opinion, that under
Sanders as reinforced by Scripps-Howard it is not a necessary
element of the constitutional requirement of case or controversy
that the plaintiff have any interest. It is enough that the statute
authorizes him to represent the public interest as a “private Attorney General.” We have seen that in the common law both in
England and the United States permits any citizen to enforce
public rights. It seems to follow that Congress may authorize any
62
individual to attack an administrative order.

Assuming that the Constitution permitted this arrangement, Professor Jaffe then went on to consider the consequences of Sanders
Brothers, discussing, as a policy matter, what the right approach
would be to the vindication of public rights in the courts.63
C. Reconciling Sanders Brothers
From today’s vantage point, the Sanders Brothers’ standing for
the public principle seems inconsistent with several Supreme Court
precedents, some of them decided prior to the Sanders Brothers
line of cases. But in the middle of the twentieth century, Sanders
Brothers stood as good law alongside those earlier cases.64 One line
of cases was relatively simple to reconcile. In 1923’s Frothingham v.
Mellon,65 the Court held that a taxpayer could not challenge the
Maternity Act of 1921, but the case was easily distinguished because the challenger in Frothingham could not point to a statutory
61

Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law 698 (1951) (citing W. Pac. Cal. R.R. Co.
v. S. Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47 (1931)). Professor Davis noted in his 1958 treatise that subsequent cases had confirmed this understanding. Davis, supra note 11, at 223.
62
Jaffe, supra note 11, at 517.
63
Id. at 517–24.
64
This is a fair characterization of judicial opinions that explain the matter. But
Judge Jerome Frank’s letters to Justice Douglas about Sanders Brothers indicate that
Judge Frank perceived a real conflict between the Sanders Brothers line of cases and
earlier cases. See notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
65
262 U.S. 447, 363 (1923).
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provision that authorized the taxpayer to bring suit. As one commentator explained in the middle of the 1950s:
The Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon was not faced with a statutory authorization allowing suit. The Court did not hold that it
was beyond the power of Congress to authorize taxpayer suits,
and the subsequent decisions in the Sanders Brothers and
Scripps-Howard cases where such a statute was upheld would
66
seem to answer any objection on this point.

The second case, Muskrat v. United States, could not be distinguished on the same ground because, in Muskrat, Congress had authorized the suit and, even so, the Supreme Court held that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear the case.67 Occasionally, but only in
dissents, members of the Court acknowledged the potential conflict, but only by asserting that Sanders Brothers itself had “dispelled” any concern that the standing for the public principle was
inconsistent with Muskrat.68

66

James R. Baird, Jr., The Right to Judicial Review: An Analysis of Section
701(f)(1), 10 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 286, 294 (1955). Justice Harlan made a similar
point in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, decided in 1968. See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
67
219 U.S. 346, 363 (1911); see also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Congress could have said that the holder of a radio license has an individual substantive right to be free of competition . . . . In that event,
unlike the situation in Muskrat . . . there would be a cause of action for invasion of a
substantive right.”).
68
Dissenting in KOA, Justice Frankfurter put it this way: “Whatever doubts may
have existed as to whether the ingredients of ‘case’ or ‘controversy,’ as defined, for
example, in Muskrat v. United States . . . are present in this situation were dispelled by
our ruling in the Sanders Brothers case . . . .” 319 U.S. 239, 259–60 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Douglas put it slightly differently. He noted that
he had doubts about “the constitutionality of a statutory scheme which allowed one
who showed no invasion of a private right to call on the courts to review an order of
the Commission” and then cited Muskrat. Id. at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his
next sentence, he observed, “But if we accept as constitutionally valid a system of judicial review invoked by a private person who has no individual substantive right to
protect but who has standing only as a representative of the public interest, then I
think we must be exceedingly scrupulous to see to it that his interest in the matter is
substantial and immediate.” Id.
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D. Standing and the Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) became law in 1946
and the state of standing law at that time is what this Part has described: a party either had to identify a violation of a “legal right”
or point to an act of Congress that allowed those without legal
rights to bring challenges to agency action “on behalf of the public.” The APA picked up both approaches. In identifying who
could challenge administrative action, the statute specified the following: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.”69 The widely accepted view of the history is that this
statement was a declaration of existing law.70 The “legal wrong”
test applied when there was no special statutory review provision;
those without legal rights had standing only if Congress adopted a
statute that allowed them to bring claims of government illegality
before the courts. After the adoption of the APA, the lower courts
applied these two tests,71 and the Supreme Court, as late as 1968,
applied the legal wrong test to determine that private competitors
to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had standing—because
the statute granted them a legal right—to challenge expansion of
TVA’s services.72
69

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
See Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 1962); Kansas City Power and
Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1955); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 95–96 (1947); see also
Harrison-Halsted Cmty. Group, Inc. v. Hous. & Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99, 104
(7th Cir. 1962). Initially, Professor Davis shared the view that the APA codified existing law. Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative
Action, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 760, 767–68 (1949). He subsequently changed his mind,
concluding that the APA extended standing to parties “adversely affected in fact.”
Davis, supra note 11, at § 22.02; Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 353, 355 (1955). Professor Jaffe rejected Davis’
position, adopting many of the arguments that Davis had initially supported. Jaffe,
supra note 11, at 529–30; Louis Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 255, 288 (1961).
71
Rural Electrification Admin. v. N. States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 692 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1967); Cobb v. Murrell, 386 F.2d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 1967); Braude v. Wirtz, 350
F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1965); Penn. R.R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Harrison-Halsted, 310 F.2d at 104 (7th Cir. 1962); Scolnik v. Conn. Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 265 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1959).
72
See Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1968).
70
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II. THE RISE OF LIBERALIZED STANDING AND THE FALL OF
STANDING FOR THE PUBLIC
The period of change in the law of standing came in the middle
of the 1960s in the lower courts and culminated in the Supreme
Court in 1970.73 Two well-known appellate court decisions—a Second Circuit case known as Scenic Hudson,74 and a D.C. Circuit case
known as United Church of Christ75—are widely regarded as the
opening bell in a period of liberalization in the law of standing.
Then, in 1970, the Supreme Court boldly rewrote the law of standing. It introduced an entirely new framework and made clear that
the new approach was intended to expand the class of persons who
were permitted to challenge government action.
Ironically, it is precisely in this period that the courts slowly
killed off the standing for the public principle. The first blows actually came in the mid-1960s appellate court cases, but it was the Supreme Court that put the nails in the coffin. That Supreme Court
action occurred in the confusing aftermath of the Court’s rewriting
of standing law in 1970. In a follow-on case in 1972, the Supreme
Court tamed the Sanders Brothers line of cases and, then, in cases
decided in 1975 and 1976, with Justice Powell as the key author,
the Supreme Court significantly restricted Congress’ ability to authorize parties to stand for the public. The full consequences of the
demise of Sanders Brothers were not to be fully realized until a
1992 Supreme Court decision, but by then it had become wellsettled law, repeated in case after case since the middle of the
1970s, that Article III imposed significant limits on Congress’ ability to authorize parties to sue to vindicate the rights of the public.
A. Mid-1960s, the Appellate Courts, and Expansion of “Legal
Rights”
Oddly enough, the initial evidence of retreat from the Sanders
Brothers principle can be seen in the two mid-1960s cases that are
73

Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1039, 1075–78 (1997).
74
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
75
Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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widely hailed as inaugurating the era of expanded standing.76 Consider, first, the conventional story about each case. The first of the
landmark cases, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission, was decided in 1965 and involved a challenge
by environmentalists and others to a power company proposal to
build a large hydroelectric facility on the Hudson River.77 The Federal Power Commission (FPC) had granted a license to the power
company under the Federal Power Act. The Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, a coalition of conservation groups and individuals organized to stop the facility, had challenged the license in
the FPC proceeding and, having failed there, challenged the FPC
order granting the license in the Second Circuit.
The agency’s first line of defense was to keep the Conference
out of court, but that effort failed. The statute had a special statutory review provision of the Sanders Brothers variety—it permitted
any “aggrieved” parties to seek review of the FPC’s actions. The
agency argued that the Conference lacked standing to sue because
it could not point to a personal economic injury resulting from its
granting of the license and therefore it was not an “aggrieved”
party. One question was whether Congress could, consistent with
the constitutional requirement that federal courts hear only cases
or controversies, permit a party to obtain judicial review of agency
action based on a non-economic grievance about such action. The
Second Circuit easily answered that question in the affirmative, observing that “the Constitution does not require that an ‘aggrieved’

76
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1728 (1975) (describing Scenic Hudson and United Church of
Christ as “landmarks in the current expansion of standing rights”); see also Peter L.
Strauss, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe—Of Politics and Law, Young
Lawyers and the Highway Goliath 308 & n.153 in Administrative Law Stories (Strauss
ed., 2006) (describing Scenic Hudson’s role in expanding standing doctrine); Tom
Turner, The Legal Eagles in Crossroads: Environmental Priorities for the Future 52
(Peter Borrelli ed., 1988) (same); Sidney A. Shapiro, United Church of Christ v. FCC:
Private Attorneys General and the Rule of Law, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 939, 955 (2006)
(explaining United Church of Christ’s role in expanding standing doctrine).
77
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). Regarding the Scenic Hudson litigation generally, see
Skip Card, Scenic Standing: The 40th Anniversary of Scenic Hudson and the Birth of
Environmental Litigation, 77 N.Y. St. B.J. 10 (Sept. 2005); David Sive, The Litigation
Process and the Development of Environmental Law, 13 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1995).
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or ‘adversely affected’ party have a personal economic interest” in
order to have standing.78
The remaining question was one of statutory interpretation: Did
the Conference count as an “aggrieved” party within the meaning
of the Federal Power Act? According to the Second Circuit, the
Act required the FPC to consider non-economic factors as it made
its licensing decisions, including the public’s interest in the “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development.”79 The FPC itself, the court pointed out, had recognized this
when it considered the company’s license application. The court
also pointed to a 1953 Ninth Circuit case where the court had
treated a sportsmen group with an interest in fish preservation as
“aggrieved” within the meaning of the Act.80 Because the Conference “by [its] activities and conduct [has] exhibited a special interest in such areas,” it “must be held to be included in the class of
‘aggrieved’ parties under [the Act].”81
In the second landmark case, United Church of Christ v. FCC,
the D.C. Circuit in 1966 set aside an FCC broadcast license renewal
because the agency had failed to permit a listener group to intervene in the relicensing proceeding.82 When WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, asked the FCC to renew its license to operate a television
station, the Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ, along with two black Mississippians, civil rights activist and
state NAACP President Aaron Henry and Reverend R.L.T. Smith,
sought to intervene in the licensing proceedings to oppose the license renewal. The challenge to WLBT was spearheaded by Rev78

Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 615 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 616.
80
State of Wash. Dep’t of Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.11 (9th
Cir. 1953).
81
Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 616. The Scenic Hudson court presented each element
in its analysis as straightforward. Perhaps worrying that its holding was indeed exceptional, however, the court for good measure added that, in any event, “petitioners
have sufficient economic interest to establish their standing” because one of the conservation groups that organized the Conference maintained trails that would be inundated by the reservoir. Id.
82
Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). Two books have been published that focus on the case. See Steven D.
Classen, Watching Jim Crow: The Struggles over Mississippi TV, 1955–1969 (2004);
Kay Mills, Changing Channels: The Civil Rights Case that Transformed Television
(2004).
79
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erend Everett Parker of the Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ, and it was part of a broader effort he undertook to bring attention to and reform racially biased reporting
appearing on television stations across the South.83 The crux of the
complaint about the station was that the segregationist views of its
owners translated into biased reporting on issues of race and the
civil rights movement.84 In its petition to the FCC opposing the station’s license renewal, the Office of Communication argued that
the station did not serve the interests of its black audience and did
not fairly represent civil rights issues. The FCC refused to allow
Parker to intervene in the FCC proceeding and it did not hold an
evidentiary hearing to assess Parker’s claims.
Parker sought review of the FCC’s action and won a stunning
victory in the D.C. Circuit. The court first considered what it called
the challengers’ “standing” to intervene in the FCC’s licensing proceeding—which the court treated as coextensive with the parties’
standing to challenge the agency’s decision in court. Under the
Communications Act, “parties in interest” could participate in licensing proceedings. The FCC had denied the challengers the right
to participate in the licensing proceedings because they would not,
if the license was granted, risk suffering either of the injuries that
could, under the traditional approach, make them “parties in interest”: economic injury or electrical interference.
The D.C. Circuit held that listener representatives like the challengers had a right to participate in the proceedings and, by extension, standing to challenge the agency’s decision in court. The
court’s elaborate defense of its holding—it offered many rationales, not all of which were consistent—made clear that it was
breaking new ground. It first admitted that the courts had, to that

83
Parker reported that he was inspired to focus on television after a meeting with
Reverend Martin Luther King in which Dr. King talked about the unfair coverage of
the civil rights movement among southern broadcast stations and asked Parker, who
had a background in broadcasting, to have the church “[p]lease do something about
the TV stations.” Mills, supra note 82, at 60. After a trip across the south where
Parker watched television and looked for a good target for his efforts, Parker settled
on Jackson because the station had a terrible record and also had the strongest signal
in the South. Id. at 65.
84
After hiring all white monitors to watch the station’s broadcast, Parker’s monitors
reported that the station extensively covered efforts to maintain segregation but did
not cover challenges to segregation. Id. at 69, 72.
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point, only granted standing to intervene in FCC proceedings
based on the two grounds the FCC had identified. But, it noted
that neither administrative nor judicial concepts of standing were
“static,”85 and that it was up to the courts to interpret the relevant
statutory provision. As the court put it, “[s]ince the concept of
standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that
only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in
a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such an
obvious and acute concern as the listening audience.”86
The court claimed that there was “nothing unusual” in granting
the consuming public the right to challenge administrative action,
pointing to several cases giving consumers (coal consumers, electricity users, transit system riders) the right to challenge rate increases, permitting a passenger to challenge racial segregation in
rail dining cars, and allowing consumers of oleomargarine to challenge orders dictating the ingredients of oleomargarine.87 In a footnote, the court cited the then-recent Scenic Hudson decision.88 Although these cases were not interpretations of the intervention
provision of the Communications Act, they were relevant (according to the court) because in each the courts were deciding whether
the challengers were affected or aggrieved (a la Sanders Brothers)
by agency action—a question that the court said could not be distinguished from which parties had standing to oppose FCC license
renewals. The court also noted that while the FCC itself was obligated to protect the public interest, that did not preclude members
of the listening public from participating in agency proceedings.89
85

United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1000.
Id. at 1002.
87
Id. (citing Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (passenger challenging
legality of ICC rules on racial segregation in rail cars); Bebchick v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (public transit rider challenging rate increase);
Read v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (consumer of oleomargarine challenging
order affecting ingredients); United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 151 F.2d 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) (electricity consumers challenging utility rates); Associated Indus. of N.Y.
State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (coal consumers challenging price order)).
88
United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1002 n.16.
89
The court explained that listeners could be watchdogs of the agency. See United
Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003–04 (“The theory that the Commission can always
effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and
participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attor86
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This mishmash of reasons added up to what the court confessed
was a surprising conclusion: “In order to safeguard the public interest in broadcasting, therefore, we hold that some ‘audience participation’ must be allowed in license renewal proceedings.”90
Both these lower court decisions were widely hailed and analyzed at the time they were decided and even more so later. They
were viewed as innovative and ushering in a new and more enlightened era of expanded standing.91 The Supreme Court took notice
of the cases as well, citing both approvingly as it rewrote standing
law in 1970.92
But that is not the whole story. Even as they granted standing,
these courts actually shifted away from the Sanders Brothers conception of standing for the public. In both cases, instead of following the Sanders Brothers script and treating the challengers as having no legal rights but still able to challenge the government action,
the courts allowed the challengers to move forward because they
had legal rights. The parties were aggrieved because they alleged
that the agency had disregarded their interests, and that their interests were made relevant by the governing law.93 Thus, environmentalists and listeners had standing because the relevant statutes
required the agency to consider those interests and the challengers
claimed that the agency had failed to do so. The challengers, in the
old formulation, were not private attorneys-general who had no
rights of their own but stood in court for the public. They had legal
rights.
neys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as
they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is
no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience,
neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.”). The court also asserted
that listeners could assist the Commission in doing its job. See id. at 1005 (listeners
needed to be heard because otherwise deficiencies would not be brought to the attention of the Commission, especially where there were no rivals for the license).
90
Id. at 1005.
91
Few observers thought the standing analysis in Scenic Hudson or in Church of
Christ were straightforward applications of existing law. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis described the standing reasoning in Scenic Hudson this way: “The Scenic Hudson opinion is filled with courageous leaps over intellectual chasms that might never
be bridged.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supplement,
§ 22.19 (1971). In Church of Christ, the court essentially admitted it was innovating.
92
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970).
93
See Merrill, supra note 73, at 1076; Sunstein, Standing and the Privitization of
Public Law, supra note 3, at 1440–42.
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United Church of Christ is less clear-cut than Scenic Hudson in
this regard. The court treated the question of intervention in the
FCC proceeding and standing to challenge the resulting administrative action as the same question. But the court’s general conclusion was that broadcasters were explicitly required by statute to
serve the public, and, as a result, “responsible representatives of
the listening public” had a right to participate in proceedings and
also had standing to challenge the resulting agency action. This ties
the listener’s standing to their own connection to interests made
relevant by the statute.
In 1966’s Scenic Hudson, the logic of the legal right test straightforwardly seeped into the understanding of which parties were “aggrieved.” In Scenic Hudson the government argued that the Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference was not aggrieved because it
could not point to a personal economic injury resulting from the
grant of the license. But, the Scenic Hudson court noted, the Supreme Court had never held that an economic injury was necessary
for a party to be aggrieved.94 And this was a fair statement of the
law. The challenger had to be aggrieved. It was clear that injury to
competitive position could count. But the fighting issue in Sanders
Brothers was not about who counted as aggrieved, but instead
whether the admittedly aggrieved but lacking-in-legal-right party
could raise the rights of others—in fact, the public’s rights—and
the Supreme Court’s answer to that was, yes, Congress could create such an arrangement. The Supreme Court did not state that the
only reason that the aggrieved party could raise the rights of the
public was because it suffered economic harm. And that is just
what the Scenic Hudson court said.95
Then, however, the Second Circuit’s analysis got strange. After
rejecting the government’s argument that one had to have a personal economic injury to count as aggrieved, the court then should
have asked what else might make a party aggrieved. So, for instance, the question might have been, can a hiking organization
devoted to the use of certain Hudson River Valley trails that will
now be under water as a result of the Federal Power Commission’s
action claim to be aggrieved? But that was not what the court did.
94
95

354 F.2d at 615.
Id.
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Instead, the court looked to the interests that the Federal Power
Act protected. “The Federal Power Act seeks to protect noneconomic as well as economic interests,” it wrote, and the Commission had admitted this.96 It turned out that this fact, along with the
challengers’ relationship to those interests, established standing:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreation aspects of power development, those who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be included in the class of “aggrieved” parties under §313(b). We hold that the Federal Power
Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special inter97
ests.

Hence, the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference was “aggrieved” because the statute required the agency to take account of
conservation values and the Conference, through its activities, had
“exhibited a special interest in such areas.”98 This was a step away
from the Sanders Brothers test, which was built out of the situation
where the challenger’s interest was not recognized in the statute or
the common law and, nonetheless, the court granted standing to an
aggrieved party and permitted him to vindicate the public’s rights.
In Scenic Hudson, the court asked the challenger to demonstrate
that the statute requires consideration of certain interests and that
the challenger had a particular relationship to those interests. This
was not only a step away from Sanders Brothers. It was a step toward the legal right test because the parties have standing only if
they can establish that their interests are recognized by statute—
that they have “rights” the statute recognizes that have been ignored by the agency.99
96

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 616.
98
Id.
99
This aspect of these two cases may have influenced the Supreme Court in its 1970
re-writing of standing law. The exact same analytic move is evident in the “zone of
interest” test the Court invented in Data Processing as it interpreted the “party aggrieved” provision of the APA. See infra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. It
seems most likely that the Court thought it was applying a kind of Sanders Brothers
principle to the APA provision itself where the APA gave rise to the cause of action.
But its test was not the Sanders Brothers principle. The zone of interest test required
97
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Why the Scenic Hudson court proceeded this way is unclear. It
could have been nervous about the government’s argument that
the interest had to be an economic one, and the long list of Sanders
Brothers cases that involved economic interest. But the court dismissed that fairly easily. It could have been responsive to the way
the Conference itself phrased its pitch for standing, that it was concerned about conservation, the statute required consideration of
conservation, and the agency had allegedly and unlawfully disregarded this interest. Whatever the explanation, in this move, the
Sanders Brothers line of cases was sapped of the private attorney
general concept, where an aggrieved party was permitted to vindicate the rights of the public.
There is no evidence, it should be said, that these courts intended to narrow standing law—indeed, just the opposite seems
true. Particularly in United Church of Christ, the court was selfconsciously expanding standing by holding that the listening public
has a “legal right” that permits it to have standing in court.100 And
yet, at the same time, by shrinking from the standing for the public
principle, these courts helped make that principle disappear.
B. The Death of Standing for the Public in the Supreme Court
The ever-so-subtle, perhaps-unintentional shift away from the
standing for the public principle that occurred in the lower courts
became far less subtle when the action shifted to the Supreme
Court.
challengers to show that the statute recognized the interests of concern to the challengers and to allege that those concerns had been disregarded. This should sound
familiar because, again, it is a trace of the legal right test. And this is what concerned
the two dissenting Justices Brennan and White. They argued that the question of
standing rested solely on an inquiry based on Article III. And, in their view, injury in
fact was all the Constitution required. Ass’n of Data Processing Servs. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 159, 167–68 (1970). To the dissenters, the requirement that the challengers
demonstrate that their interests were regulated or protected by the statute at issue—
even arguably—was the legal wrong test all over again. Id. at 168 (“By requiring a
second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the
challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected interests.”).
100
Sunstein views this as a salutary step, one that could have strongly liberalized
standing. See Sunstein, Standing and the Privitization of Public Law, supra note 3, at
1440–42. Merrill reads the courts to be doing this as well, but he expresses no view on
it. Merrill, supra note 73, at 1076.
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1. The 1970 Revolution
Understanding what happened to the standing for the public
principle in the Supreme Court must start in 1970 with Data Processing, for that is when the seismic shift in standing doctrine occurred.101 Data Processing was a classic competitor suit. Those selling data processing services were not pleased when the
Comptroller of the Currency announced a new rule permitting
banks to enter their market. They challenged the rule, claiming
that the interpretation violated the relevant statute because it permitted banks to engage in non-bank activities. The Eighth Circuit,
applying then-existing law, held that the data processors did not
have standing because they had no legal interest and the statute did
not contain a Sanders Brothers provision, which would have permitted them “to assert the public’s rights.”102 As the court put it,
“Without a legal interest or the status of a recognized ‘aggrieved’
party, the complaint resolves itself into an attempt merely to show
‘a common concern for obedience to law.’”103 So much followed the
treatises.
Data Processing in the Supreme Court did not. Applying the earlier law, the Court should have proceeded much like the Eighth
Circuit and asked whether the competitor had alleged injury to a
legally protected interest. But the Court did not conduct anything
that looked like that inquiry. Justice Douglas first observed that
standing was to be considered in light of the Constitutional case or
controversy requirement.104 He then turned to the APA, which was
the source of the challenger’s cause of action. Construing the provision that permitted those suffering “legal wrong because of
agency action” or “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to challenge agency
action in court,105 Justice Douglas said that this required the chal-

101
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The new
test adopted in Data Processing was applied in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164
(1970), which was decided on the same day as Data Processing.
102
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir.
1969).
103
Id. (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)).
104
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151.
105
Id. at 153–54 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 & Supp.
IV)).
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lenger to demonstrate two things. Most important, it had to show
that the agency’s action had caused him “injury in fact, economic
or otherwise.”106
This terminology was startling because the Supreme Court had
never before used the term “injury in fact” in connection with
standing law.107 This injury-in-fact test, which Justice Douglas
seemed to offer as an interpretation of the APA’s statutory provision (though in light of Article III), was to replace the “legal
wrong” test.108 Noting that the lower court had searched for a “legal
interest” to establish standing (it could have been excused for doing so), the Court treated that test as improper: “The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.”109
In theory, the injury-in-fact test was to ask whether a party was factually injured by government action, rather than ask whether the

106

Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
In the period immediately preceding Data Processing, the Court had asked
whether the challenger had a “personal stake” in the outcome. This phrase came from
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (“Have the appellants alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.”).
A search of the Westlaw United States Supreme Court Cases database shows three
instances of the phrase “injury in fact” prior to 1970. None of these are in the context
of standing. Professor Davis first proposed an “adversely affected in fact” test in 1955.
His goal, he wrote, was to 1) broaden the availability of standing, 2) simplify standing
doctrine, and 3) implement his interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, supra note 70, at 354–55. He
continued to support the novel test in subsequent work. Davis, supra note 11, §§
22.03–22.04 (1958). In 1970, when the Court adopted the “injury in fact” and “zone of
interests” tests in Data Processing, Professor Davis wrote that the Court was “threequarters of the distance” toward a coherent standing doctrine. Kenneth Culp Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 450–51 (1970). Professor
Davis would have required only “injury in fact.” Id.
108
The majority opinion is ambiguous, though Justice Brennan read the majority as
treating “injury-in-fact” as an interpretation of Article III. See Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In subsequent
cases, injury-in-fact was treated as an interpretation of the APA and in a pair of cases
in 1974, injury-in-fact was treated as a gloss on Article III’s case or controversy requirement. See cases discussed in note 116, infra.
109
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
107
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challenger could assert injury to a legally recognized right or privilege.110
Although the Supreme Court said very little by way of elaborating on the meaning of the injury-in-fact test—except that it could
be “economic or otherwise”111—the result in Data Processing
proved that the injury-in-fact test expanded the class of persons
who had standing to challenge administrative action. Where before
competitive injury could be a “legal wrong” only if the statute
made such considerations relevant, the Court stated that competitive injury easily satisfied the injury-in-fact test.112 In defining what
counted as an injury in fact, the Court seemed to be borrowing
from the Sanders Brothers idea of who counted as “aggrieved”
when a statute permitted such parties to challenge agency action.
Before 1970, the correct answer on an administrative law exam
would have been that Sanders Brothers was not relevant because
there was no special statutory review provision.
The Supreme Court’s invention of the injury-in-fact test was
enough for a headline, but the Data Processing Court was not finished with its re-invention of standing law. The Court then announced an entirely separate test—subsequently known as the
zone of interest test—that the challenger had to satisfy in addition
to injury in fact, which was “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”113 The Court presented this test as an interpretation of the APA’s permission to those “aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute” to challenge agency action in court. Again, the Court treated this test as liberalization in
110
As many pointed out, the court did not really ask about “injury” without reference to unstated ideas about what sorts of injuries gave rise to standing—and hence
this was not a “factual” inquiry at all. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 231–33.
111
The internal correspondence in Data Processing and the related case of Barlow v.
Collins demonstrates that at least some Justices were anticipating future cases involving non-economic injuries. See Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice Brennan (Jan.
9, 1970) (William O. Douglas Papers, Files on Association of Data Processing Servs.
v. Camp, No. 69-85, Box 212, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington,
D.C.); Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas (January 8, 1970) (William O.
Douglas Papers, Files on Barlow v. Collins, No. 69-249, Box 215, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.).
112
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
113
Id. at 153.
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the law of standing. As the Court put it approvingly, those interests
might represent “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational, as
well as economic values,”114 and it cited the two landmark lower
court cases just discussed, Scenic Hudson and United Church of
Christ. As for the competitor’s injury at issue in Data Processing itself, the Court said that a provision of the statute that prohibited
banks from engaging in non-banking activities brought the competitors within the zone of interest.115
The Supreme Court thus completely butchered the prior law. It
ignored the decades of precedent that treated the APA terms “adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute” as a reference to “party aggrieved” provisions of the Sanders
Brothers variety. It is true that, if one were starting with nothing
but the text of the APA, the Supreme Court’s interpretation might
be one reasonable construction of the bare words of the APA—a
party aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute. But that
is not what those words meant when Congress chose them, or, for
that matter, for many years thereafter in the courts. Nonetheless,
as Data Processing made quite clear, its approach liberalized standing. The Court permitted an economic competitor to challenge
agency action where, under the prior tests, it would not have been
permitted to do so.
*

*

*

It was in the aftermath of Data Processing that the standing for
the public principle died in the Supreme Court. Chaotic is the only
way to describe that aftermath. For several years, majorities of the
Supreme Court were unclear whether the newly minted injury-infact test was an interpretation of the judicial review provisions of
the APA or an interpretation of Article III’s case or controversy
requirement.116 The Supreme Court also started to re-explain its

114

Id. at 154 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 155–56.
116
In Data Processing, the majority identified the injury-in-fact requirement and the
“zone of interest” test after it observed that while “[g]eneralizations about standing to
sue are largely worthless,” one generalization was acceptable—namely, that standing
needed to be considered “in the framework of Article III.” 397 U.S. at 151. In his partial concurrence and dissent in the companion case of Barlow v. Collins, Justice Bren115
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prior law on standing. Sanders Brothers, for instance, became a
case that turned solely on the competitor’s economic injury.117 More
nan read the injury-in-fact test to be the constitutional minimum required by the case
or controversy requirement of Article III. 397 U.S. at 167–68.
Whether the injury-in-fact test was an interpretation of Article III took a couple of
years to settle, however. In 1972, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the majority treated the
injury-in-fact test as an interpretation of the APA. See 405 U.S. 727, 733 (“[I]n Data
Processing Service v. Camp . . . we held more broadly that persons had standing to obtain judicial review of federal agency action under §10 of the APA where they had
alleged that the challenged action had caused them ‘injury in fact’”). In dissent in
1972, Justice Douglas said that injury in fact was the test for whether there was an Article III case or controversy. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 184 n.4
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In 1973, a Court majority again treated injury in fact
as an interpretation of the APA. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (reiterating that in Data
Processing and Barlow v. Collins, “we held that §10 of the APA conferred standing to
obtain judicial review of agency action only upon those who could show ‘that the challenged action had caused them injury in fact’”); id. at 689 n.14 (“‘Injury in fact’ reflects the statutory requirement that a person be ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’
and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation—even though small—from a person with a mere interest in the problem.”).
In 1974, however, a majority of the Supreme Court made clear that the injury-infact test was an interpretation of the case or controversy requirement of Article III
and, more than that, it (re-)read Data Processing to have established this point. See
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974) (“[T]he
Court . . . held that whatever else the ‘case or controversy’ requirement embodied, its
essence is a requirement of ‘injury in fact.’”) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)). And the point has been wellestablished law ever since. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 2531, 2535 (2008); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003);
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000), Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
117
The most significant place this occurred was in 1972’s Sierra Club v. Morton. See
405 U.S. 727, 736–38 (1972). See discussion, infra notes 119–130 and accompanying
text.
Explanations of the Sanders Brothers line of cases have suggested that it stood for
the proposition that only those economically injured by administrative action were
permitted to sue. For instance, this is how Richard Stewart explained these cases in
1979. See Richard Stewart, Standing for Solidarity, 88 Yale L.J. 1559, 1569 (1979). As
the text states, this is the way the Supreme Court eventually started to explain Sanders Brothers, most notably in 1972 in Sierra Club v. Morton. See 405 U.S. 727, 734 n.6,
736–38. But, as Part I explains, in the 1940s, the Supreme Court did not emphasize the
economic nature of the injury as the central fact permitting the challenger to bring the
rights of the public before the courts. Instead, the key point that the Court considered, and answered in the affirmative, was whether Congress could authorize an aggrieved party without any cognizable legal rights to challenge administrative action.
The court put very little emphasis on what counted as aggrievement—the key point
was that the aggrievement had nothing to do with any recognized legal rights of the
challenger.
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surprisingly, the Court opined several times that the Court’s earlier
“legal right” test was an interpretation of Article III of the Constitution,118 which made the Sanders Brothers line of cases inconsistent
with Article III, as they were cases where the parties did not have
any legal rights. These developments were part of the revision of
standing law that occurred in the aftermath of Data Processing.
During that revision, as the next two parts reveal, the standing for
the public principle was erased.
Even before the clear-cut doctrinal shift can be detected in the
mid-1970s, the Supreme Court’s discomfort with the standing for
the public principle became evident in 1972’s Sierra Club v. Morton. The Sierra Club had challenged the U.S. Forest Service’s decision to permit the construction of a ski resort and recreation area
in the Mineral King Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains.119 Morton is one of those (many) Supreme Court cases where the important work is done in the Court’s framing of the question. And in
this case, that framing was aided by a revisionist version of the history of standing doctrine.
The Court began by explaining that, in the Court’s recent Data
Processing case, the injuries had been to competitive position. Such
“palpable” economic injuries, the Court stated, “have long been
recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing, with or without a specific statutory provision for judicial review.”120 Actually,
no. Prior to 1970, whether such competitive injuries were sufficient
to confer standing depended on the existence of a legal right or a
Sanders Brothers’ provision that permitted aggrieved parties to
challenge administrative action. But equipped with this version of
the history, the Court began to frame its question. Those with eco118
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 733 (“Early decisions under [the APA judicial review provision] interpreted the language as adopting the various formulations
of ‘legal interest’ and ‘legal wrong’ then prevailing as constitutional requirements of
standing.”); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) (“Reduction
of the threshold requirement [in Data Processing] to actual injury redressable by the
court represented a substantial broadening of access to the federal courts over that
previously thought to be the constitutional minimum under [the APA].”).
119
The statutes governing the Forest Service did not contain a statutory review provision permitting “aggrieved parties” to sue, and Sierra Club relied on the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 405 U.S. at 734. Data Processing, in reading the APA the way it did, had elided the distinction so important in prior
law between APA actions and special statutory review actions.
120
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733–34.
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nomic injuries could (always) establish injury in fact, but what
about parties with non-economic injuries?
The stage-setting was not over. It was not simply that the Sierra
Club’s injuries were non-economic, but also that they were widely
shared. Concern about widely shared injuries is a recurrent theme
in justiciability doctrines, and is prominent in several standing
cases in this period.121 As the Supreme Court saw it, the relevant
precedents did not speak to the question “which has arisen with increasing frequency in federal courts in recent years,” namely,
“what must be alleged by persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that are widely shared?”122 This statement of concern excised the Sanders Brothers line of cases. The
standing for the public principle permitted parties to raise widely
shared injuries. Indeed, in retrospect, that is what makes them remarkable.
After creating these questions, the Court decisively answered
them. First, non-economic injuries were sufficient. The Court approvingly noted that the trend in the cases had been toward recognizing non-economic injuries as a basis for standing, citing United
Church of Christ and Scenic Hudson, among other cases. “We do
not question that this type of harm may amount to an ‘injury in
fact’ sufficient to lay the basis for standing under . . . the APA,” the
Court wrote.123 “Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in
our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”124 Count
this in the “expanded standing” column on the standing scorecard.
Although non-economic injuries were fine, widely shared injuries were not. And here is where the Court explicitly addressed
Sanders Brothers, (re)explaining it in the process. Sierra Club, the
Court explained, tried to rely on the standing for the public principle, but the Club failed to understand what that principle permitted. According to the Court, the Club argued that, given that this
121
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175–76 (1974); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
122
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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was a “public” action related to the use of natural resources, the
Club’s special interest in and expertise in these matters were sufficient to give it standing as a representative of the public.125 Indeed,
the Sierra Club was the ideal party to represent the public’s interest because it was organized around protecting those interests.
The Court soundly rejected this argument because, the Court
said, it misunderstood the Sanders Brothers line of cases, which the
Court explained this way:
[T]he fact of economic injury is what gives a person standing to
seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is properly invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with its
statutory mandate. It was in the latter sense that the ‘standing’ of
the appellant in Scripps-Howard existed only as a ‘representative
of the public interest.’ It is in a similar sense that we have used
the phrase ‘private attorney general’ to describe the function performed by persons upon whom Congress has conferred the right
126
to seek judicial review of agency action.

With this (new) take on the workings of Sanders Brothers at
hand, the Court held that Sierra Club failed to establish standing.
The crux of the problem was that Sierra Club had not established
any individual injury. “[B]roadening the categories of injury that
may be alleged in support of standing,” the Court warned, “is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.”127 And Sierra
Club had failed to show it was individually harmed: “Nowhere in
the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use
Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way
that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the
respondents.”128 Without such individual injury, there could be no
125
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736 (“The Club apparently regarded any allegations of
individualized injury as superfluous, on the theory that this was a ‘public’ action involving questions as to the use of natural resources, and that the Club’s longstanding
concern with and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a ‘representative of the public.’”) (footnote omitted).
126
Id. at 737–38.
127
Id. at 738.
128
Id. at 735. According to the Sierra Club, it was forced to argue this way at this
stage of the litigation. In its view, it could not seek a preliminary injunction while as-
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standing. This holding, the Court made clear, was intended to cut
off lower courts that had found various public interest groups to
have standing because they had demonstrated an organizational interest in issues like environmental or consumer protection.129 Such
an approach, the Court warned, would authorize “judicial review at
the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more
than vindicate their own value preferences” in the courts.130 The individual injury requirement, the Morton Court seemed to say,
would put an end to that.
2. The End of Standing for the Public
Despite the Court’s obvious discomfort with the standing for the
public principle in Morton, that principle did not actually meet its
(unacknowledged) death until 1976. In 1976, Justice Powell wrote a
majority opinion making clear that all plaintiffs—regardless of
whether they could point to a statutory authorization of their
suit—had to demonstrate that they had suffered an injury in fact
and, given how the Court was by then defining injury in fact, that
meant the end of standing for the public.
a. Statutory Authorization of “Public Actions”
The death of the standing for the public principle is now so settled that it is easy to forget that it retained vitality well into the
middle of the 1970s. Until the Court’s decisions to which this Article will turn shortly, judges and government litigants acknowledged
that Congress could authorize “public actions”—and by using
those terms, they meant that Congress could authorize suits (conserting a “private injury,” because such an injury could never outweigh the government’s interest in going forward with the project. As the Club put it in its reply brief:
The Government seeks to create a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ situation in
which either the courthouse door is barred for lack of assertion of a private,
unique injury or a preliminary injunction is denied on the ground that the litigant has advanced private injury which does not warrant an injunction adverse
to a competing public interest. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (No. 70-34).
See also Robert H. Freilich, Editor’s Comments, Sierra Club v. Morton, No Standing
in Our National Parks—Move Over for the Special Interests, 4 Urb. Law. vii, ix
(1972).
129
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
130
Id. at 740.
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sistent with the standing for the public principle) by those who suffered no personal or proprietary injury that could be distinguished
from the rest of the population, but who were nonetheless authorized to bring suit to “vindicate public rights.”131 Evidence of this
comes, first, from 1968’s controversial case of Flast v. Cohen.132
Flast granted standing to taxpayers who sought to enjoin the use of
federal funds to buy textbooks for use in parochial schools, thus
carving out an important exception to the prohibition on taxpayer
standing established in 1923 in Frothingham v. Mellon. (The majority’s holding in Flast, of course, indicates that Article III does not
prohibit taxpayer suits, but Flast was fairly quickly limited to its
facts, a pattern that continues to this day.133)
It was Justice Harlan’s much noted dissent in Flast that featured
the Sanders Brothers principle. He argued that the Court should
not—as a matter of judicial self-restraint—recognize taxpayer
standing in Flast. Borrowing from well-known academic phrasing
used by Louis Jaffe in his articles at the time (which themselves
borrowed from the ideas developed by Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld),134 Justice Harlan argued that the taxpayer-plaintiffs in
the case were non-Hohfeldian—that is, they could claim no injury
to a recognized legal right or privilege. Instead, he noted, they
131

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Here is how Harlan defined public actions:
We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs complain, just as the
petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as taxpayers, but as ‘private
attorneys-general.’ The interests they represent, and the rights they espouse,
are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general population, taxpayers and non taxpayers alike. These are and must be, to adopt Professor Jaffe’s useful phrase, ‘public actions’ brought to vindicate public rights.
Id. at 119–120. Louis Jaffe defined public actions as situations where the plaintiff “is
not able to satisfy the requirement of special interest, when he brings his action as a
representative of the general public.” Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 459 (1965).
132
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
133
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 596–97 (2007); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 333 (2006), Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
618 (1988), Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
173 (1974).
134
Flast, 392 U.S. at 119 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1033 (1968).
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complained as private attorneys-general. They had the same interests that everyone else had; indeed, they were “indistinguishable
from any group selected at random from among the general population.”135 To Justice Harlan, the challengers were bringing (again
borrowing from Louis Jaffe and others) a “‘public action[]’” in order to “vindicate public rights.”136
Despite his opposition to granting the taxpayers standing in
Flast, Harlan acknowledged that public actions of this sort could be
heard in the federal courts. In fact, he had no doubt that permitting
such suits would be constitutional. The federal courts, Harlan observed, “have repeatedly held that individual litigants, acting as
private attorneys-general, may have standing as ‘representatives of
the public interest.’”137 And what was his primary proof for this
point? The Sanders Brothers line of cases, as well as a series of
lower court cases.138 While the cases were “by no means free of difficulty,” Harlan thought it “clear that non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs as
such are not constitutionally excluded from the federal courts.”139
The question, for Harlan, was under what circumstances the courts
should permit such actions. Because he saw many risks to the judiciary from federal courts recognizing public actions, he argued that
the courts should entertain them only when Congress so authorized
them. As he put it:
This Court has previously held that individual litigants have
standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack of
economic or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits . . . . I would adhere to that principle.
Any hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the
three branches of the Government would be substantially dimin-

135

Flast, 392 U.S. at 119–20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 120.
137
Id.
138
Id. (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470 (1970); Scripps-Howard Radio v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Reade
v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943)).
139
Flast, 392 U.S. at 120 (emphasis omitted).
136
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ished if public actions had been pertinently authorized by Con140
gress and the President.

Justice Douglas, who concurred in the majority in Flast, disagreed with what he seemed to think were Justice Harlan’s quaint
notions about Congressional authorization of such suits. In his
view, the Court should not “wait for Congress to give its blessing to
our deciding cases clearly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” for that
would “allow important constitutional questions to go undecided
and personal liberty unprotected.”141 Despite that disagreement between the Justices, there seemed to be no disagreement about the
fundamental point of interest here: Congress had the power to authorize public actions, and the Sanders Brothers line of cases stood
for the principle.
The same understanding is evident—tellingly—in the government’s briefs in Morton,142 just discussed. There, the government’s
brief on the merits explained that Sierra Club could not establish
standing without a special statutory review provision of the Sanders
Brothers variety. According to the government, Sierra Club, “although it apparently might have claimed a more traditional basis
for standing,” attempted to establish standing based “only on a
statute declaring an undifferentiated ‘public’ interest, in this case
an interest in the preservation of certain types of values in designated public lands.”143 The Supreme Court, the government
claimed, had not yet reached the question whether a party had
standing in such a circumstance. The government’s brief then acknowledged that “Congress has undoubted power to authorize
such litigation,” citing Judge Frank’s decision in Ickes that coined
the term “private attorney general” and quoting at length from the

140
Id. at 131–32 (footnote omitted). In the footnote, Harlan then attempted to reconcile the Sanders Brothers’ principle with Article III of the Constitution. He explained that he would not abrogate Article III restrictions upon actions that could be
properly brought in federal court when “Congress has authorized a suit.” He explained, however, the primary problematic case, Muskrat v. United States, could be
distinguished because in that case, the United States “evidently had ‘no interest adverse to the claimants.’” Id. at 132 n.21.
141
Id. at 112.
142
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
143
Brief for the Respondent at 17, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (No.
70-34).
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case.144 But it had not done so in this case; there was no special
statutory review provision on which the Sierra Club could rely. After citing lower court cases in which standing was granted where
there was a special statutory review provision, the brief concluded
that “in the absence of such a legislative judgment, a citizen asserting an interest essentially limited to having the law obeyed should
have no standing to sue.”145
The Morton Court itself, writing in 1972, appeared to agree with
the government’s view about the scope of the Congressional power
to authorize public actions. In restating the law of standing with respect to Congress’ ability to authorize suits, the Court observed
that where Congress had authorized a suit, the “inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff.”146 In a footnote, the Court recognized there were some limits on this power:
Congress could not authorize the Court to issue advisory opinions
(citing Muskrat v. United States) or entertain friendly suits.147 That
this did not intend to limit Congress’ ability to authorize public actions is made clear by the remainder of the footnote. The Court
went on to say that Congress could, other than those limits, determine who the proper parties were to bring suit. The Court then
cited Sanders Brothers, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast (where he
discussed Sanders Brothers), Judge Frank’s opinion in Ickes (where
he discussed Sanders Brothers and the concept of private attorneysgeneral), and two academic articles (one by Raoul Berger and one
by Louis Jaffe) that argued that the requirement of individual injury was not an Article III requirement.148
As a final bit of evidence of the robustness of this standing for
the public principle well into the 1970s, consider Justice Powell’s
concurrence in 1974’s United States v. Richardson.149 There, the
Court held that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of parts of the laws governing the CIA. In Pow-

144

Id. at 17, 20–21.
Id. at 21–22 (emphasis added); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732
& n.3 (1972).
146
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732.
147
Id. at 732 n.3.
148
Id.
149
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
145
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ell’s concurrence, which set the stage for the key cases Powell
would write in the coming years, he acknowledged that Congress
had the authority to authorize public actions. His acceptance of the
standing for the public principle came at the end of an opinion that
was mostly devoted to taking up and expanding upon the set of arguments Justice Harlan made in dissent in Flast v. Cohen. Taxpayer standing presented great risks to the judiciary, warned Powell, and he urged the Court to limit Flast v. Cohen to its facts.
Powell did agree, however, that the Supreme Court had “confirmed the power of Congress to open the federal courts to representatives of the public interest through specific statutory grants of
standing,”150 citing the Sanders Brothers line of cases.
Thus, as late as 1974, what this Article calls the standing for the
public idea was alive and well in the cases.151 Congress could authorize “public actions”—that is, it could authorize those without
an otherwise cognizable injury to bring challenges to governmental
action. Such a statute could permit parties to bring public rights to
the courts to, for instance, assert the general public interest in the
government abiding by the law. To be sure, as Justice Harlan’s dissent acknowledged in a footnote,152 there were some constitutional
limitations on Congress’ ability to authorize public actions, but, as
was true in the 1940s, the Justices and litigants did not linger over
precisely what those limits were, apparently because, whatever
those limits were, they were not pertinent to the points they were
making. For Justice Harlan, in other words, if there were a statute
granting taxpayer standing, those limits would not have been a barrier to taxpayer standing in Flast, and if there were a statute granting Sierra Club standing, the government itself admitted that those
limits would not have been a barrier to Sierra Club’s argument for
standing in the Morton case. The same is true of Justice Powell in

150

Id. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring).
There are several other examples that reinforce the point. Justice Douglas, writing in Data Processing, explained the Sanders Brothers case in the following way:
“The third test mentioned by the Court of Appeals, which rests on an explicit provision in a regulatory statute conferring standing and is commonly referred to in terms
of allowing suits by ‘private attorneys general’ is inapplicable in the present case.”
Ass’n. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 n.1 (1970).
152
Flast, 392 U.S. at 132 n.21.
151
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Richardson.153 The problem in all these cases was that there was no
such statute. As the Supreme Court put it several times in this period (before 1976), a party had to establish an injury in fact “in the
absence of a statute granting standing.”154
b. The Death of Standing for the Public
This was not long to be. By 1976, every challenger—relying on a
statutory review provision or not—had to establish an injury in fact
and its rapidly growing sub-elements because, as it had by then become clear, the injury in fact requirement was the bare minimum
requirement of Article III. This shift meant that, after 1976, parties
stood, if at all, only to ask the courts to redress their own, individual injuries. Congress could no longer authorize them to stand for
the public.
Justice Powell was the key architect of the shift and he made his
concerns about the liberalization of standing law known almost as
soon as he was appointed to the Court. In 1974, he wrote a lengthy
concurrence in United States v. Richardson, the taxpayer standing
case just discussed. There, he catalogued many reasons why the
federal courts should not entertain such suits.155 When Powell went

153

See 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[M]y objections to public actions are ameliorated by the congressional mandate. Specific statutory grants of
standing in such cases alleviate the conditions that make ‘judicial forbearance the part
of wisdom.’” (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast v. Cohen)).
154
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“[D]espite the diminution of standing requirements in the last decade, the Court has
not broken with the traditional requirement that, in the absence of a specific statutory
grant of the right of review, a plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that sets
him apart from the man on the street.”) (emphasis added); id. (“The Court has confirmed the power of Congress to open the federal courts to representatives of the
public interest through specific statutory grants of standing.” (citing Sanders Brothers)); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (“Although the law of standing has been greatly changed in the last 10 years, we have steadfastly adhered to the
requirement that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.”) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
155
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188–93 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 192 (“[W]e risk a progressive impairment of the effectiveness of the federal
courts if their limited resources are diverted increasingly from their historic role to the
resolution of public-interest suits brought by litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens.”).
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from writing a separate opinion to writing two majority opinions,
one in 1975 and one in 1976, he shifted the doctrine in a decisive
way and established the now boiler-plate language on both the
meaning and source of the injury-in-fact requirement.
Justice Powell did two important things in these cases. He was
explicit that the requirement of injury as the Court was developing
it was a bare minimum Article III requirement and had to be demonstrated even where parties could point to explicit authorization
of suit. Beyond that, these cases also expanded what it meant to establish that Article III injury. The injury had to be individual, “distinct and palpable” as the Court had previously said in cases like
Sierra Club v. Morton, but it also had to be caused by the defendant’s actions and redressable by the court. No statute could
change these requirements. And with this, Sanders Brothers was
dead.
The first of the pair of cases is Warth v. Seldin,156 where the Court
held that several organizations and individuals did not have standing to challenge the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York. The
substantive claim was that the zoning ordinance effectively prevented the building of low and moderate income housing, thus excluding poorer people from residing in Penfield.
As Justice Powell explained the relationship between statutory
authorization of suit and standing law, he turned what had seemed
to be a statutory holding in Morton into a clear-cut constitutional
requirement. He took a circuitous route, though. First, he emphasized that Article III judicial power existed only to “redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even
though the court’s judgment may benefit others collaterally.” The
plaintiff, he continued, generally “must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights
or interests of third parties.”157 This, of course, is the opposite of
what the Supreme Court of the 1940s seemed fairly comfortable
with, as evidenced by the Sanders Brothers line of cases. As the
Court put it, in 1975, without such requirements—which Powell described as “closely related to Article III concerns but essentially

156
157

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 499.
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matters of judicial self-governance”158—the federal courts would be
in the business of deciding questions that should be decided by
other institutional actors.159
Those prudential limitations on raising the rights of others could
be changed by a statute that authorized parties to bring suit, Powell
acknowledged, but only if the challenger could show the kind of injury (and here was the key first move) required by Article III.
Thus, the Court accepted that it was permissible for “Congress [to]
grant an express right of action to persons who would otherwise be
barred by prudential standing rules”160 (and here he was referring
to what he had just emphasized, which was what he called the usual
rule that one cannot raise the rights of others). But, the Court immediately added, “[o]f course, Article III’s requirement remains:
the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible
litigants.”161 As long as this individual injury could be shown, Congress could grant individuals “standing to seek relief on the basis of
the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the
general public interest in support of their claim.”162 The majority
then cited the Morton Court’s re-explanation of Sanders Brothers,
as well as Sanders Brothers itself.
That these words were carefully considered is clear from the Justices’ internal papers on the case. In the original draft opinion, Justice Powell’s words were slightly different. He originally wrote that
Congress could grant individuals standing “to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and indeed of the public generally.”163 Chief Justice Burger objected in writing to the reference to Congress’ ability to authorize parties to seek relief on
behalf of the “public generally.” He wrote, “I question whether we
should or need say one can ‘seek relief on the basis of the legal
rights . . . of the public generally.’ Even though that generalization
has many exceptions it may be read as a holding.” He concluded
158

Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 501.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Warth v. Seldin, No. 73-2024, Opinion, First Draft, p. 9. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA (emphasis added).
159
160
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that, “It seems to me that a person who has been granted statutory
standing by Congress must seek relief solely for the ‘distinct and
palpable injury to himself.’”164 Justice Powell, in a subsequent draft,
noted instead that they could “invoke the general public interest”
in support of their claim.165
This carefully considered phrasing in the opinion aside, Warth
decisively shifted standing law in the direction that is now familiar.
As noted above, on the Warth Court’s reading, the individual injury the Court demanded in Morton was not an interpretation of
the APA, but rather was a bare minimum requirement of Article
III. Thus, to take a salient example from the period, an “organizational interest” in an issue of concern could not—constitutionally—
make out an injury sufficient for Article III purposes. The challengers had to identify an individual, concrete injury to the organization, or individuals within it.
But Warth did more than that. It also articulated additional injury requirements that sprung from Article III. Among other failings, the low-income plaintiffs in Warth did not properly allege
facts that would have allowed the Court to conclude that the restrictive zoning scheme was the cause of their failure to find housing in Penfield or that, if the Court granted relief, they would be
able to find housing in Penfield. The challengers’ housing problems
could stem from their poverty, not the allegedly illegal acts of the
city, and, as a result, they could not show that the defendant’s actions caused their injury, nor could they show that a judgment from
the court would redress it.166 After Warth was handed down, then,
164
Warth v. Seldin, No. 73-2024, Correspondence from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Lewis Powell, June 5, 1975, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001, Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA.
165
Warth v. Seldin, No. 73-2024, Opinion, Fourth Draft, p. 9. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA.
166
Warth, 422 U.S. at 507. The Court relied heavily on Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1972), where the Court held that the mother of an illegitimate child did not
have standing to bring a class action designed to force enforcement of the child support laws in Texas. In the 1972 case, however, the Court made clear that cases where a
statute explicitly authorized suit would be different. See id. at 617 (“[W]e have steadfastly adhered to the requirement that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly
conferring standing, federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.”).
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Article III requires every plaintiff to show an individual injury that
is caused by the defendant and can be redressed by the Court. Previously the Court had identified injury requirements that challengers had to show “in the absence of a statute explicitly authorizing
suit.”167 The Warth Court stated that these requirements applied
even where a statute authorized suit.
But there was no discussion of an explicit statutory authorization
of suit in Warth. It is in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky,168 decided the
next year and also written by Justice Powell, that the Court
brought its (rapidly growing) injury requirements to bear in a case
where the parties were statutorily authorized to sue. In Simon, lowincome individuals and organizations representing them sought to
challenge an IRS decision that gave favorable tax treatment to
hospitals as “charitable” institutions even where the hospitals did
not provide services to the poor to the extent of their financial ability.169 The cause of action was based on the APA provision allowing
those who suffered legal wrong or were aggrieved by agency action
to challenge that action in court.170 Recall that the Court had, in a
1970s watershed case, (re)read that APA provision to permit challenges by any party who could establish an injury in fact.171 Simon
turned on whether the parties had established such an injury.172
Much of what is in Simon was not new after Warth. The Court
said very clearly that the Data Processing “injury in fact” requirement was required by the Constitution and not simply a matter of
interpreting the APA.173 It also made clear, in its holding, that the
167

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
169
Id. at 29–32.
170
Id. at 58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (regarding challengers who bring action under
the Administrative Procedure Act).
171
Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
172
The Court made clear in a footnote that its decision did not rest on the “zone of
interest” test also established in Data Processing. Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19. Justice
Powell was not a fan of the zone of interest test. See Warth v. Seldin, No. 73-2024,
Correspondence from Justice Lewis Powell to Chief Justice Burger, June 6, 1975,
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA.
173
Simon, 426 U.S. at 38–39 (“In Data Processing . . . this Court held the constitutional standing requirement under this [APA] section to be allegations which, if true,
would establish that the plaintiff had been injured in fact by the action he sought to
have reviewed.”) (citation omitted); id. at 39 (“The necessity that the plaintiff who
seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an
168
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elements of that Article III injury included not only a concrete, individual injury,174 but one that was caused by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful action and could be remedied by a judicial judgment.175 It is apparent from Justice Powell’s correspondence with
his clerk on this point that he was determined to make clear that
(as we would say today) injury, causation, and redressability were
all requirements of making out an injury in fact.176
What is important about Simon is that the challengers could
point to an explicit authorization of their suit (albeit one that existed in part because of the fancy footwork of the Court in its 1970
decision in Data Processing). It was one thing for the Court to state
in 1975 that the injury requirements applied even where Congress
had explicitly authorized suit and it was another to actually apply
those injury requirements in a case where such an authorization existed. And that is just what the Court did in Simon.
The Court did not sweep away the history that this Article has
explicated without any recognition. It acknowledged that it had
previously stated that challengers had to establish an injury in fact
“at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing.”177 But this was merely a reference, the Court now explained,
to cases that permitted Congress to recognize new legal rights.178
(This did not, however, capture the Court’s previous use of this ca-

Art[icle] III requirement. A federal court cannot ignore this requirement without
overstepping its assigned role in our system of adjudicating only actual cases and controversies.”).
174
Id. at 40 (holding that organizations devoted to advocating for indigents cannot
have standing based on their “abstract concern with a subject that could be affected
by an adjudication” (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972))).
175
Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (explaining an injury required by Article III is injury to
challenger that can be redressed by a court); id. at 41–46 (stating challengers cannot
show that injury of denial of hospital care is caused by defendant IRS, as opposed to
hospitals who are not before the court, and thus cannot show that action by court
would redress injury).
176
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., No. 74-1123, Memo from Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. to Phil Jordan, Feb. 16, 1976, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Ms 001,
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA.
177
Simon, 426 U.S. at 41.
178
Id. at 41 n.22 (referencing that a statute expressly conferring standing “was in
recognition of Congress’ power to create new interests the invasion of which will confer standing . . . . When Congress has so acted, the requirements of Art[icle] III remain: ‘[T]he plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if
it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants’”) (citation omitted).
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veat. In one case, the caveat did appear to refer to Congressional
creation of additional legal rights.179 But in Richardson, Justice
Powell’s reference to “specific statutory grant[s] of the right of review” was clearly a reference to the Sanders Brothers line of
cases.180) Even where Congress had done so, the Court continued,
“the requirements of Article III remain”181 and, as Simon made
clear, those requirements included an individual injury caused by
the defendant and redressable by a Court.
Justice Brennan’s angry concurrence in Simon came back again
and again to the fact that Congress had authorized the suit. “Any
prudential, nonconstitutional considerations that underlay the
Court’s disposition of the injury-in-fact standing requirement in
[Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Warth v. Seldin] are simply inapposite when review is sought under a congressionally enacted statute
conferring standing and providing for judicial review.”182 All that is
required under the Constitution, Brennan argued, is a personal
stake in the outcome and the challengers had clearly established
that.183 Justice Brennan concluded by identifying the “most disturbing aspect of today’s opinion,” which he identified as the Court’s
insistence on resting its holding squarely on Article III, and “effectively placing its holding beyond congressional power to rectify.”184
When it handed down Simon on June 1, 1976, the Supreme
Court erased the standing for the public principle. Oddly enough,
as recently as two years before, Justice Powell himself, writing in
concurrence, acknowledged Congress’ ability to statutorily authorize “public actions,” but by 1976, that was no longer true. Injury in
fact (as the Court was by then defining it) is a bare minimum requirement of Article III that every plaintiff, even those with statutory authorization to sue, must demonstrate. Theoretically, chal-

179

See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194–95 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
181
Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 n.22.
182
426 U.S. at 58–59 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 59 n.7 (“[I]t is distressing that the Court should mechanically apply the approach developed [in Linda R.S.
and Warth v. Seldin] to a case brought under the Administrative Procedure Act without any analysis . . . of the only constitutional dimension of standing—the requirement
of concrete adverseness flowing from a personal stake in the outcome.”) (citation
omitted).
183
Id. at 60.
184
Id. at 64.
180
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lengers who satisfy these injury requirements might be able to (like
the Sanders Brothers challengers) advance the rights of the public
in court, but only, as Justice Powell put it in Warth, “collaterally.”185
(And it is worth noting that even this sort of language about advancing the “public interest” disappears in Simon.) But given that
the point of each element of the injury in fact requirement is to test
the challenger’s personal connection to the injury caused by the
(allegedly) unlawful actions of the defendant, a court collaterally
reaching the public’s interest, for instance, in the correction of legal
errors by the government, seems remote indeed.
Technically, one could argue that the standing for the public
principle does not really die until 1992, when the Supreme Court
decided the well-known Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.186 This is
so—in a technical sense—because 1976’s Simon was a case where
the challenger’s cause of action was the APA, and was not based
on a special statutory review provision of the Sanders Brothers variety. Before 1970’s Data Processing, the difference between an
APA action and a special statutory review action was critical.187
Data Processing diminished that distinction in important ways, but,
even so, one might say that Sanders Brothers could not officially
die until the Supreme Court applied its Article III injury-in-fact
requirements in a case where the challenger relied on a special
statutory review provision like that at issue in the Sanders Brothers
line of cases. And that is precisely what occurred in 1992’s Lujan
case. There, the Supreme Court applied what it had established
over fifteen years earlier in Warth and Simon to a case where the
cause of action was an old-fashioned special statutory review provision—specifically, the citizen suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act.188 But by then, Sanders Brothers might as well have
never existed. It had been excised from the narratives of standing
law.189 Instead, it had become mantra, repeated in the cases and the
185

422 U.S. at 499.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
187
Data Processing, with its creative reading of the APA provision, blurred the line
between APA cases and special statutory review cases. See supra text accompanying
notes 99–113.
188
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
189
A Westlaw search reveals that Sanders Brothers was cited in four cases between
Warth in 1975 and the 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders and never for the “standing
for the public” principle in this Article. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
186
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treatises, that Article III requires individual injury, causation, and
redressability—even where Congress has explicitly authorized suit.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FALL: CONTEXT AND EXPLANATION
The most obvious question is why. Why, in the very period
where courts expanded access to the courts, did the Supreme Court
read Article III in such a way as to prevent Congress from authorizing parties to stand for the public and, in so doing, bury a longstanding doctrine? Legal change is a complex phenomenon and
providing a persuasive explanation of the change identified here is
especially challenging because of the conflicting currents in the
law—the courts both expand and retract standing. Given that complexity, this Part does not aspire to fully explain the change in the
law chronicled here. Instead, it starts by looking to developments
outside the Court in order to place the Court’s decision in context.
The most important development is the emergence of a large public interest bar and Congress’ embrace of their tactics as a key
means to improve government decisionmaking. Those developments outside the Court, it turns out, do suggest an explanation for
the Court’s actions because the Court was clearly uncomfortable
with the manifestation of those developments inside the court—the
proliferation of “public interest” suits. This Part concludes by suggesting one explanation for the fall of the standing for the public

584–85 n.36 (1990) (citing Sanders Brothers for the principle that direct federal control over discrete programming decisions is unwise); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479
U.S. 388, 394 n.8 (1987) (citing Sanders Brothers as an example of a case that involved
a statute that gives review to all persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 588–89, 589 n.14 (1981) (repeating FCC’s citation of Sanders Brothers and citing Sanders Brothers’ statement
that broadcasters are not common carriers); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775, 803–04 (1978) (citing Sanders Brothers for skepticism about the utility of
widespread divestiture of ownership of newspaper-broadcast combinations); id. at
805–06 n.24 (citing Sanders Brothers for the irrelevance of private losses under the
Communications Act when there is no adverse effect on broadcasting service to the
public).
After 1990, Sanders Brothers was not cited again in a Supreme Court opinion until
eighteen years later, when the majority opinion in Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins
relied on Sanders Brothers and its progeny to read the special statutory review provision at issue as one that, because it used the “party aggrieved” language, “cast[s] the
standing net broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory
rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.” 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998).
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principle: it was a victim of the Court’s discomfort with the ascendant litigation-oriented model of reformist politics.
A. The World Outside the Supreme Court: The “Public Interest”
Era
Consider first what was happening outside the courts. The most
pivotal development was the explosion in the number of public interest lawyers who set their sights on challenging governmental action in court. From today’s vantage point, the groups that challenged the federal agencies in the middle of the 1960s—the Federal
Power Commission in 1965, the Federal Communications Commission in 1966—seem unremarkable, but they were pioneers in these
arenas. In 1965, not even a handful of groups devoted to litigating
on behalf of the “public”—listeners, consumers, drivers, the environment—existed. By 1970, just five years later, that had changed.
These lawyers were one part of much broader social and political
movements organized around various quality of life issues.190 A
quick summary of the relevant highlights of the period can capture
only some of its flavor, but it does provide important context. In
1962 Rachel Carson published Silent Spring,191 which had a remarkable public following and is often credited with awakening a broadscale public consciousness about environmental concerns.192 In
1964, Congress adopted the Wilderness Act193 and amended the basic federal pesticide law, which dated to 1947, in order to create a
mechanism to cancel pesticide licenses.194 In 1964, Ralph Nader arrived in Washington, and he figured prominently in the hearings
leading up to Congress’ decision, in 1966, to establish the first of
the new generation of health and safety agencies, eventually called
190

For a general description and critique of the work of many of these groups, see
Michael W. McCann, Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism (1986). With respect to the environmental movement and its successes in this
period, see Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves:
A History of American Environmental Policy (1999); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the
Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement pt. II (1993);
Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law ch. 4 (2004).
191
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin 1962).
192
Lazarus, supra note 190, at 43.
193
Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964).
194
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat.
190 (1964).

MAGILL_BOOK

1184

8/19/2009 6:46 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:1131

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and
charge it with the task of developing motor vehicle safety standards.195
1970 was a crucial year, particularly for the environment. On
January 1, President Nixon signed the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),196 and in April, 1970, twenty million people
gathered to demonstrate on the first Earth Day.197 By December
1970, Congress had approved the far-reaching Clean Air Act of
1970198 and President Nixon had created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through a reorganization plan.199 This was the
year of the environment, but it was not only that. It was also the
year that Congress approved the Occupational Safety and Health
Act and created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to administer the Act.200 For those tempted to count,
by the end of 1970 Congress had created three major new regulatory agencies in less than five years.
In 1972, the EPA banned the use of Rachel Carson’s target—
DDT201—and Congress passed more landmark legislation, including
the Clean Water Act,202 important amendments to the federal pesticide law,203 and the Consumer Product Safety Act,204 which created
the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In 1973, Congress
passed the Endangered Species Act205 and the Department of Interior created yet another new agency, the Mining Enforcement and
Safety Administration, which was to enforce mine safety laws in195

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718 (1966); Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety
ch. 3 (1990).
196
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347).
197
Lazarus, supra note 190, at 44.
198
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
199
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/
org/origins/reorg.htm; Alfred A. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 5, 9–21 (1991).
200
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
201
Press Release, EPA, DDT Ban Takes Effect (Dec. 31, 1972), available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/ddt/01.htm.
202
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
203
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat.
973 (1972).
204
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
205
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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dependently of the Bureau of Mines.206 The year 1974 saw the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act207 and 1976 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.208
1. Congress, the New Agencies, and Public Interest Litigation
That whirlwind tour of political developments ignores causes
and consequences. But it is only intended to create context for understanding the model of reformist politics that emerged in this period. That model took litigation by public interest lawyers to be essential to advancing reform in these areas. Congress, as it created a
new generation of agencies, both acknowledged and embraced
public interest litigation as essential to ensuring the success of the
regulatory regimes.
Starting in 1966, when Congress created each new agency and
charged it with a mission, it contemplated the possibility of judicial
challenges to the agencies’ actions and, more than that, it contemplated that those legal actions would be brought by lawyers representing the “public interest.” This is familiar to us now, but it was a
new development as of the middle of the 1960s. When Congress
adopted the modern system of drug regulation in 1962, it did not
include any special statutory review provision that would allow
public interest lawyers to sue the government or private parties.209
Nor did Congress do so when it adopted the Wilderness Act in
1964.210
But by 1966, public-interest lawyers and the lawsuits they were
to bring were an acknowledged—and celebrated—part of the new
regulatory regimes that Congress created. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Act, approved in 1966, required the new auto safety
agency to adopt motor vehicle safety standards that would be
“practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall

206

In 1977, Congress passed the Mine Act, which created and now governs the successor agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Federal Mine
Safety and Health Admendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290
(1977).
207
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974).
208
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580 (1976).
209
Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
210
Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964).
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be stated in objective terms.”211 The statute provided that “any person who will be adversely affected by such order” could file a petition in a federal appellate court.212 The House report explained that
the term “adversely affected” had been construed by the courts to
“permit many diverse individuals and groups and associations of
individuals to have judicial review of administrative actions.”213 On
the House floor, Congressman Smith of Iowa asked the floor manager whether a state attorney general could be considered a party
aggrieved—because, for instance, the price of state-purchased automobiles was increased without a commensurate increase in
safety. The floor manager responded that, yes, in his opinion the
attorney general would count as aggrieved and thus would be able
to challenge the agency’s actions. Congressman MacDonald asked
whether “adversely affected” would include “anybody who drives a
car, or a defective car and has an accident, or has reason to suppose
he will have an accident by virtue of the fact that the car was not
properly turned out” and the floor manager of the bill responded
that, in his view, such a person would be aggrieved within the
meaning of the act. Just to make clear his concern, Congressman
MacDonald ended by clarifying that those who could challenge the
agency’s action were not “confined to the industry or to people
who manufacture cars,” and the floor manager again agreed.214
The year 1970 brought something old and something very new.
The “old” could be found in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSH Act) of 1970, which followed the Auto Safety Act
model. The Act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and, under Section 6, commanded it to
promulgate occupational safety and health standards. The provision permitted “[a]ny person who may be adversely affected” by
such a standard to challenge it in federal appellate court.215 The
211

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 89563, 80 Stat. 718, 719.
212
Id. § 105(a)(1).
213
H.R. Rep. No. 1776, at 20–21, reprinted in 2 NHTSA, National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966: Legislative History 126–27 (1985).
214
Cong. Rec. 19650-19651 (1966) (statement of Rep. MacDonald), reprinted in
2 NHTSA, National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966: Legislative History 125 (1985).
215
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6(f), 84 Stat.
1590, 1597 (1970).
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statute also authorized the Secretary of Labor to seek penalties
against employers who violated safety and health standards or
failed to satisfy a series of general duties imposed on employers.
Such citations could be contested and, if they were, they were adjudicated in front of an independent adjudicatory body called the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (also established in the OSH Act). Section 11 of the Act permitted “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved” by an enforcement order to
seek judicial review of it.216 As explained in the House-Senate Conference Committee report, the House bill had permitted only the
Secretary of Labor and employers to challenge enforcement judgments but the House had receded to the broader Senate version.217
Far more innovative than the OSH Act, however, was the Clean
Air Act of 1970.218 The Act included the first “citizen suit” provision and, since that moment, such provisions have been included in
nearly every piece of federal environmental legislation. The Clean
Air Act provision imagined citizens as both private enforcers of existing EPA dictates as well as direct watchdogs on EPA activities.
“[A]ny person” could initiate a civil action against “any person” alleged to be in violation of an existing EPA emission standard or
limitation. “[A]ny person” could also commence a civil action
against the Administrator of the EPA “where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty . . . which is
not discretionary.”219
The most extensive debate on the provision took place in the
Senate. Senator Hruska objected that the provision would flood
the courts, and he inserted into the Congressional record a lengthy
memorandum that outlined a series of objections. The memo described the provision as “unprecedented in American history,” not216

OSHA § 11(a), 84 Stat. at 1602 (1970).
Conf. Rep. to accompany S. 2193, H. Rep. 91-1765, at 39, reprinted in Legislative
History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Subcommittee on Labor
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Committee Print, at 1192
(1971).
218
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
219
Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304(a), 84 Stat. at 1706. The provision authorized courts to
award injunctive relief. Unlike the later-enacted Clean Water Act, the provision did
not authorize civil penalties, which would have permitted citizens to seek relief for
past violations. Courts were, however, permitted to award litigations costs, including
attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees, “whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.” See Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304(d), 84 Stat. at 1706.
217
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ing that it rested on the “erroneous” assumption that Executive
Branch officials would not do their jobs. “Never before in the history of the United States,” the memo opined, “has the Congress
proceeded on the assumption that the Executive Branch will not
carry out the Congressional mandate, hence, private citizens shall
be given specific statutory authority to compel such officials to do
so.”220 With this bit of overstatement, the memo went on to argue
that the provision would subject every administrative action, or inaction, to challenge in the courts, flood the courts, and lead to inconsistent application of the laws.
In defending the provision, Senator Muskie first cast the citizen
lawyers as mere supplements to agency enforcement—extra investigators detecting violations so that an agency could proceed
against violators.221 The next day, in the face of similar objections,
Muskie inserted a staff memo that defended the provision according to this optimistic story, but also according to a less optimistic
one. Not devoid of overstatement itself, the Muskie memo noted
that the cost of more lawsuits was a trifle because, in a “government of the people,” citizens must be permitted to sue to remedy
administrative failure: “The provision is directed at providing citizen enforcement when administrative bureaucracies fail to act.”222
The citizen suit provision became a model for similar provisions in
environmental statutes enacted in subsequent years—including the
Clean Water Act (1972),223 the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act (1972),224 the Noise Control Act (1972),225 the Endangered Species Act (1973),226 the Toxic Substances Control Act

220

Senate Debate, in Legislative History, v. 1, p. 277.
Senate Debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970, reprinted in Legislative History, v. 1, pp.
273–81 (Hruska-Muskie exchange).
222
Senate Debate, in Legislative History, v. 1, p. 352; see also id. (“Citizen enforcement may add to the burden of the courts—but in a democracy, the answer cannot lie
in the denial of citizen access to the courts—in a society of Government of and by the
people we foreclose participation by citizens at our peril.”).
223
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972).
224
MPRSA of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, § 105(g)(1), 86 Stat. 1052, 1057 (1972).
225
Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 12, 86 Stat. 1234, 1243 (1972).
226
ESA of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11(g), 87 Stat. 884, 900 (1973).
221
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(1976),227 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(1977).228
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), approved in 1972,
was closer to the Clean Air Act model than the 1966 model of the
highway traffic safety agency. The Act itself was a much scaledback version of the Senate-passed bill, which called for the creation
of a new Food, Drug, and Consumer Product Agency. The Senate
bill transferred a wide variety of consumer product safety activities
from other agencies, especially the FDA, and added new responsibilities as well. The final statute followed the House version, which
left most FDA activities where they were, in an agency within the
Department of Health Education and Welfare. The statute authorized the CPSA to promulgate consumer product safety standards.229
In authorizing judicial review of such standards, the statute went
one big step beyond the Sanders Brothers formulation picked up in
the auto safety act, but not quite as far as the citizen suit provision
of 1970. The statute permitted “any person adversely affected by
such a rule, or any consumer or consumer organization” to challenge the rule in federal appellate court.230 To the extent that “any
consumer” is a slightly narrower category than “any person,” the
CPSA did not go quite so far as the 1970 statute.
2. Public Interest Lawyers
As it created a new generation of agencies, Congress was thus
careful to adopt provisions permitting judicial challenges to agency
action or even, in the case of citizen suits, to permit private parties
to stand in for the agency itself and enforce the law against violators. It is quite clear that, while Congress surely expected regulated
parties to challenge agency action, it had in mind “public interest”
litigants who would prod the agency to go further in implementing
its statutory mandate.
These statutory provisions are both a marker of and an embrace
of the model of reformist politics that emerged with full force in
this era. That model took litigation to be a key mechanism of social
227

TSCA of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 20, 90 Stat. 2003, 2041 (1976).
SMCRA of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520, 91 Stat. 400, 503–504 (1977).
229
Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 7, 86 Stat. 1207, 1212–15
(1972).
230
CPSA § 11(a), 86 Stat. at 1218.
228
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change. Reformist groups devoted to environmental protection,
consumers’ rights, the eradication of poverty, and many other goals
sprung up in this period. Some of these groups used well-worn tactics such as lobbying or direct action intended to persuade policymakers in Congress and the executive branch to consider their interests. But many of these groups believed that bringing lawsuits
was a key tool to advance their groups’ interest. And this turn toward litigation influenced long-standing groups as well.
Litigations as a key tool for pursuing social change was, of
course, not genuinely new. There were important antecedents to
the rapid growth of public interest lawyers in the 1960s. They included the National Consumers’ League litigation starting in the
early 1900s, the ACLU litigation starting in the 1920s, the NAACP
and later the Legal Defense Fund founded in 1949, and the Committee on Law and Social Action formed by the American Jewish
Congress in 1945.231
But in the mid-1960s a new, much larger, generation of lawyerpolicymakers emerged and they relied on litigation to advance
goals that had not previously been advanced through litigation.232
Study after study bears out the enormous growth in public interest
lawyers in this period. Seminal work by Professor Joel Handler
finds that, of the seventy-two public interest law firms233 that existed in 1976, only four of them existed prior to 1965—meaning
that sixty-eight came to life in the decade between the middle of
the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s.234 The Council for Public Interest Law identified ninety-two public interest firms in 1976,

231
See Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 483, 484–85 (1984).
232
Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207, 224–31 (1976).
233
Handler defines a public interest law firm as one that is 1) part of the voluntary
sector; 2) uses primarily legal tools such as litigation; 3) involved primarily in actions
that, if successful, have a substantial external benefits component or a high public interest ratio. Handler, infra note 234, at 49. Handler’s definition would include lawyers
working in the legal aid area as well as lawyers working on issues such as consumer or
environmental protection or occupational and auto safety.
234
Joel F. Handler, Betsy Ginsberg, & Arthur Snow, The Public Interest Law Industry, in Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis 42, 50 (Burton A.
Weisbrod ed., 1978).
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which was up from fifteen in 1969.235 Professor Kornhauser and
Dean Revesz observe that, between 1960 and 1970, the percentage
of total lawyers in the U.S. working in public interest positions
nearly doubled from 1.1% to 2.1% of all lawyers. In this period,
the total number of lawyers grew at the rate of 24%, and the number of lawyers in the public interest field grew at a rate of almost
240%.236
For those public-interest lawyers who targeted regulatory policymaking, consumer advocate and “one-man army”237 Ralph Nader
was an early embodiment of this group and also its most recognized participant in the early years. Nader’s earliest efforts focused
more on the Congress and agencies than on the courts. He made
his mark pressing for new legislation, first for auto safety, then for
a variety of consumer protection statutes. Nader developed a signature style: a combination egghead, muckraker, and legal reformer. He had a genius for generating publicity. His message was
almost always the same: exhaustively documented investigations
exposing the dangers ordinary citizens faced due to the incompetence or malice of large corporations and their many friends in the
bureaucracy. He appeared in any and all venues, writing articles,
giving speeches, testifying before Congress. And, even when he
was essentially acting alone in his early years, he generated enormous publicity for his concerns. In 1967 alone, he played a role in
the passage of four laws.238 His profile that year put him on the
cover of Newsweek in early 1968.239
Nader’s work started to go beyond his single-man show in 1968.
That summer, he formed the Center for Study of Responsive Law
and hired his first batch of “Nader’s Raiders.” Two of them, Harvard Law students, had written him asking where they could sign
up for Nader’s “judicious jihad” because they were “disgusted
235

Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public
Interest Law in America 79 (1976). This figure excludes legal aid and legal services
lawyers and includes only “policy-oriented” groups.
236
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 829, 839 (1995). Kornhauser and Revesz count legal aid oriented firms as well as
lawyers working on issues like environmental or consumer protection.
237
Justin Martin, Nader: Crusader, Spoiler, Icon 64 (2002).
238
Id. at 70–73.
239
Id. at 73.
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Harvard graduate students who must endure endless years of drivel
in order to mechanically defend the guilty and profitably screw the
consumer.”240 This group of students spent the summer investigating the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and they produced a
185-page report condemning the FTC (“a self-parody of bureaucracy, fat with cronyism, torpid through inbreeding”). The report
made a splash. The students testified before Congress and in early
1969, newly elected President Nixon asked for an ABA report of
the FTC. Nader continued to hire groups of raiders each summer
and hired a permanent staff for the Center in 1969 so that it could
investigate and expose full-time.241
By 1970, there were rivals for the title of people’s representative.
John Gardner formed Common Cause in that year to “ensure government and political process serve the general interest rather than
special interest.”242 But no one quite competed with Nader. His
empire was expanding and, increasingly, Nader and his spin-offs
were turning to the litigation process as a way to advance his
causes. Nader formed Public Interest Research Group in 1970, and
its lawyers set about searching for cases to advance “consumer’s interests” in health care, pensions, tax policy, and the environment.243
In 1971, Nader founded Public Citizen and under that umbrella he
created a series of groups, including the Health Research Group,
which focused its attention on the Food and Drug Administration’s
work, and the Public Citizen Litigation group, which focused on
litigation on behalf of “the public.” With Alan Morrison at the
helm, the Litigation Group focused on appellate litigation and, especially in the early years, involved itself in Freedom of Information Act (passed in 1966) litigation and in controversies over im-

240

Id. at 75 (quoting from letter to Nader from Harvard Law students Robert Fellmeth and Andrew Egendorf). The Summer of 1968 group included Fellmeth and
Egendorf, as well as William Howard Taft IV, Edward Finch Cox (a Princeton senior), Peter Bradford, Judy Areen, and, the oldest of the bunch, John Schultz, a 29year-old assistant professor of law at University of Southern California Gould School
of Law. Id. at 76.
241
Craig, Courting Change, infra note 244, at 12–22; Martin, supra note 237, at 80–
85.
242
Letter from John Gardner Announcing the Formation of Common Cause (Aug. 18,
2007) available at http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=189955;
see also John W. Gardner, In Common Cause 15 (1973).
243
Martin, supra note 237, at 123.
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poundment and the legislative veto.244 By 1974, Nader or Naderlike groups existed “in the areas of auto safety, aviation, health research, corporate responsibility, land use, water quality, food
safety, women’s issues, and science and technology.”245
In the same period, much of the growing environmental movement turned to the litigation process to promote their agenda.246
Long-standing conservation and wildlife groups turned increasingly
to litigation. The Sierra Club and the Izaak Walton League are telling examples. The Sierra Club was founded in 1892 and the Izaak
Walton League in 1922. Both had services for their outdoorsmen
members and engaged in extensive legislative and administrative
lobbying, especially the Sierra Club. But it was not until the 1960s
that they began to rely seriously on litigation to promote their
agenda.247 Sierra Club formed the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
to take over the litigation over Disney’s proposed development in
Mineral King.248 Izaak Walton League started to join litigation in
the late 1960s and thereafter made appearances in many lawsuits,
sometimes along with other organizations, sometimes by itself.249
Not only were longstanding organizations increasingly looking to
the litigation process to advance their agenda, but several wholly
new organizations were formed and immediately began to bring
precedent-setting litigation. In 1967, a group of activists on Long
Island who wanted to combine scientific expertise and law to protect the environment founded Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF). Inspired in part by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, its early
efforts were focused on eliminating the pesticide DDT.250 EDF did
not limit its efforts to lawyers and litigation, but its litigation was
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important immediately.251 Early on, EDF brought several high profile cases that helped spell the end of DDT. Between 1970 and
1973, circuit courts of appeals resolved a dozen cases originally
brought by EDF.252
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) was also
founded in this period, in 1970. NRDC was formed out of two
groups. The first group was Yale Law graduates who wanted to
start an environmental law firm upon graduation. The second was
New York law firm lawyers who had worked on the Scenic Hudson
litigation and were, as a result, interested in starting a law firm devoted to litigating over resources issues. They formed themselves
as the Natural Resources Defense Council, hired John Adams as
their first director, and approached the Ford Foundation about
start-up funding. Ford by then had been talking to the Yale Law
group and suggested the two connect up. Once formed, NRDC
quickly involved itself in litigation.253 Between 1972 and 1975, circuit courts of appeals resolved nearly twenty cases brought by
NRDC.254
These (and many more) groups that emerged in this period put
some or all of their faith in lawsuits as a mechanism for advancing
the causes of interest to them.255 The growth in these groups would
not have happened without the Ford Foundation, which decided in
1967 to channel funds to public interest law groups, a practice that
continued for over a decade and involved millions of dollars of
support.256 Ford provided critical start-up and ongoing funding for
EDF, NRDC, and Sierra Club’s Legal Defense Fund.257
One concrete example of the effect of this phenomenon can be
seen by looking at standing cases prior to 1965. Between 1940 and
1965, courts of appeals resolved over eighty cases in which they relied on Sanders Brothers to decide whether a party had standing to
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challenge administrative action.258 Sometimes they granted standing, sometimes they did not. But nearly all of those cases involved
parties with an economic or material interest in the consequences
that would flow from an agency decision. The vast majority of
cases were brought by competitors—existing license holders under
the Communications Act or the Federal Power Act or economic
actors in competing markets (for instance, newspapers in the same
market as a new broadcast licensee). A couple were brought by
employees whose fate would be altered by an administrative decision. And a couple, like Ickes discussed above, were brought on
behalf of consumers who would pay higher prices as a result of
administrative action. Those are the cases that most closely resemble what was to come. But it is not until Scenic Hudson (1965) and
United Church of Christ (1966) that a reader of the legal reports
starts to see legal challenges that look like the routine litigation of
the early 1970s. The trickle becomes a flood very quickly.
B. The New Public Interest Litigators Meet the Supreme Court
While the model of reformist politics that relied on litigation as a
key mechanism for reform was embraced by Congress, the same
cannot be said of the Supreme Court. In the standing cases this
Section seeks to understand, the Supreme Court expressed consternation over these “public interest” suits. The concern runs deep
enough that it provides a plausible—if admittedly somewhat speculative—explanation for the elimination of the standing for the public principle.
Consider first the cases between 1970 and 1976 in which the Supreme Court reconstructed standing doctrine in the aftermath of its
1970 decision in Data Processing. Nearly all of the key cases have
public interest litigators on one side of the case or another. This is
true in Sierra Club v. Morton (environmental group challenging Interior Department), United States v. SCRAP (environmental
groups challenging Interstate Commerce Commission), Schlesinger
v. Reservist Committee to Stop the War (anti-war group challenging
reserve status of members of Congress), Warth v. Seldin (poor
people and advocates for low-income housing challenge local zoning ordinance), and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky (poor people and
258
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organizations representing poor people challenge IRS ruling).
Each of these cases was actually brought by lawyers drawn from
the new cohort of public interest litigators. In another key case in
the period, United States v. Richardson, the taxpayer challenger—
seeking disclosure of the CIA budget—was represented by the
American Civil Liberties Union, an organization that had long
turned to the courts to advance its mission.259
These cases unquestionably created consternation among at
least some of the Justices. Several distinct concerns emerge. One
common theme is the fear that lawsuits (the metaphor of choice
always seems to be a “flood” of such suits) could stop the government in its tracks. Justice Powell’s internal papers in Richardson
(where he ended up writing a lengthy concurrence) reveal outrage
that a single taxpayer might be able to force the disclosure of the
CIA’s budget.260 Likewise, in 1972’s Morton, the Supreme Court rejected out of hand Sierra Club’s argument that its long-standing interest in environmental matters made it the ideal party to challenge
the government’s action. “[I]f any group with a bona fide ‘special
interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why
any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest
would not also be entitled to do so.”261
But the concern went much deeper than a worry over numbers.
Lots of lawsuits is one thing. Lots of lawsuits of this sort is another.
Although it is no simple task to articulate the precise concern,
some of the Justices thought that entertaining these cases raised
some sort of flag representing illegitimate judicial action. Justice
Powell staked out his position on this matter early, writing a seventeen-page concurrence in Richardson in 1974 (Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion ran only thirteen pages). Almost ten pages
259
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of that concurrence warn about the dangers of recognizing taxpayer standing. Taxpayer standing would expand judicial power
and shift governance away from democratic decisionmaking, lead
to the inappropriate judicial supervision of the executive and legislative branches, and, in the end, ultimately injure the Article III judiciary by diverting its attention away from its traditional role.262
The Court should not, Justice Powell warned, abandon its historic
role of protecting rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups in favor of “public-interest suits” that involve
“amorphous general supervision of the operations of government.”263 Powell’s opinions in Warth and Simon are similarly filled
with references to the “properly limited” role of courts in a democratic society.264
This legitimacy concern was framed in a more direct way in
1972’s Morton decision. There, the Court explained that its requirement of individual injury would put the decision as to whether
review of government action should be sought in hands of those
who “have a direct stake in the outcome,” as opposed to permitting
(apparently what that plaintiffs sought) “judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than
vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process.”265 The concern here is not simply “supervision” of the executive branch by the courts, but supervision at the behest of ideological advocates who are attempting to enlist the courts in their
262
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policy-reform campaign. This, the Morton Court seemed to be saying, is not what courts (should) do.
There is no direct link in the documentary materials between
these concerns about “public-interest” suits that were clearly on
the mind of the Justices and a self-conscious decision to excise the
standing for the public principle from the law. And perhaps that
was an accident, an oversight produced by the mess that was Data
Processing’s revision in standing law combined with a failure of advocacy. Reading the opinions, and what private documents are
available, one detects that at least some Justices felt that the new
public interest litigators were asking the courts to decide cases that
were not appropriate for adjudication in an Article III Court. Morton is the case that makes this most clear—this is not a Court about
to embrace (even if it is continuing a line of pre-existing cases)
“standing for the public.” In response, the Court expanded what a
party had to show to demonstrate an injury in fact and at the same
time constitutionalized those requirements. Together, those doctrinal moves stamped out the standing for the public principle.
CONCLUSION
The primary agenda of this Article has been to recover a history
of standing law that is now lost to us and to explain—in what turns
out to be a complicated tale—exactly how and when we lost it. The
lesson of that analysis is that the history of standing law is more
complicated than our present version of that history would suggest.
There was a time when the courts were not reluctant to entertain
suits that, as the courts themselves said, adjudicated, not private
rights, but the “rights of the public” in court, as long as Congress
had authorized the suit. At one time, the Supreme Court gave
Congress more leeway than it does now to structure the judicial enforcement of legal obligations.
The secondary agenda of the Article is to speculate about why
the standing for the public principle died when it did. Given the
complexity of explaining legal change and the lack of clear-cut evidence of motivation, the last part of this Article can do no more
than suggest that the standing for the public principle was a victim
of the Supreme Court’s discomfort with the public interest lawyers
and their efforts at reform when they showed up in the courtroom.
Even if the causal speculation is not persuasive, however, looking
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to the developments outside the courts does remind us that the Supreme Court was, in this case, an outlier. The political branches—
through citizen suit provisions most prominently—embraced the
new model of reformist politics that saw litigation as a key tool to
advance social welfare. Whether the Court’s erasure of the standing for the public principle was a reaction or not, the Supreme
Court refused to accept a congressional design that enlisted “any
person” or “any citizen” to enforce legal obligations by litigating in
the federal courts.

